The military dogma of the USA that Turkey is a strategic ally must change. It has outgrown its utility and is now becoming a liability.
The only reason that might preserve the dogma is military expenditure. But this is not a good enough reason in today’s world.
With Putin strongly in charge of a Russia that is never going to settle for less than equal when it comes to world power, the USA must now admit that their foreign and military policies have grown out of date.
Turkey can never play the role of a buffer between Russia and the Middle East. It has become the opposite. Russia is the main factor of instability as they fuel the conflict in the Middle East and use it to increase their sphere of influence.
This is the strategic game that the USA lost so far.
Putin embraced the Syrian regime and gave them the assurance they needed in order to survive ISIS and the other rebel forces.
Now Putin is there to stay and create more problems for the rather rigid and unsuspecting USA.
It is not an accident that Turkey is becoming best friends with Iran and that rumours of the development of Turkey’s nuclear capability are in the air.
Wake up USA before it is too late for you and the rest of the western world!
Two Greek military officers have been arrested on the 1st of March allegedly because they entered Turkish territory without permission.
The two officers were patrolling an area they knew very well, but the weather conditions were bad, and visibility was low.
As I write this, the officers remain in custody in Edirne, in a high security facility, while the Turkish judicial system is dealing with the case.
People who know the area claim that incidents like this were quite frequent in the past and were handled swiftly and informally by both sides, without placing personnel in custody.
The Greek Government appeared to be quite relaxed at the beginning, expressing optimism that the case will be settled wuickly and the officers will return to Greece. They were so relaxed that the press announcement made by the Army’s General Command was rather slopy, indirectly accepting the characterization of the incident by the Turkish side as “entry into Turkish territory”, even though they had no way of knowing this at the time.
As the days go by, the situation is turning into something more serious, and the Greek Government is now raising the issue with international organizations like NATO. The otimism of the first days has deflated and given its position to anxiety and concern.
Serious questions are asked regarding the unfolding of the incident, as it is claimed that the officers were on Greek territory and they were ambushed by the Turkish “Gendarma”. The Greeks resisted arrest and sustained injuries. This is the reason, according to some sources, that in the photographs released by the Turks following the incident the Greek officers’ faces are covered by hoods.
Why is Turkey acting like this? There is a simple explanation that relates this event to a 15th July 2016 event that is very high on Ankara’s agenda.
Not only the eight officers were not returned to Turkey, but during President Erdogan’s visit to Athens in December 2017, he was told by the Greek Prime Minister Tsipras that the Greek Judicial System is independent of the Executive, the Government, therefore this is not an issue he can deal with. It is outside his realm of powers.
To make things worse, President Erdogan has claimed while in Athens that Prime Minister Tsipras had promised him that the eight Turkish officers would be returned to Turkey. Therefore, he implied that Mr. Tsipras is not a man who keeps his word.
What we see developing now in the incident with the two Greek officers, is a mirror image of the eight Turkish officers’ incident, as far as its treatment by the Turkish Government is concerned.
The Turkish side repeatedly states that the matter will be decided by the court in Edirne, and the Turkish Army and Government have nothing to do with it.
If this is the case, Turkey is following a “tit for tat” strategy.
Tit for tat means “the infliction of an injury or insult in return for one that one has suffered.”
This is bad news for the Greek officers, because their case might drag on for a long time. It is also bad news for the Greek Government, who appear to be consistently missing the mark when it comes to dealing with Turkey.
The traditional conciliatory low-key approach that Greece has followed in its Turkish relationships, no longer works because Turkey has switched to an open conflict strategy.
Solutions ot this type of problems do not grow on trees, and I could not possibly claim to have one.
However, there is an old saying that “the solution of a problem begins with its recognition”.
Turkey is not playing stupid games. Turkey is a very serious country and Mr. Erdogan a capable and strong leader. The Greek Government must consider all incidents, including this one in Evros within a framework of ongoing open conflict, not a framework of good relations gone bad.
There lies the recognition of the problem.
Greece is conflicted with Turkey in a very serious way and the strategic analysis of this situation is far more complicated than the recognition of “tit for tat” in the Evros incident. As one might expect the necessary actions are even more serious and complicated, but Greece does not have a choice.
Conciliation leads to defeat and humiliation. The Greek people expect their government to do much better than that.
Το βράδυ της Δευτέρας 12 Φεβρουαρίου 2018 μία τουρκική ακταιωρός σχεδόν εμβόλισε πλοίο του Ελληνικού Λιμενικού Σώματος στα Ίμια. Δεν υπήρξαν θύματα, παρά μόνον περιορισμένες υλικές ζημίες, χάρη στην ψυχραιμία και δεξιοσύνη του Έλληνα πλοίαρχου.
Τις επόμενες δύο εβδομάδες τουρκικά πολεμικά πλοία απέκλεισαν την ΑΟΖ (αποκλειστική οικονομική ζώνη) της Κύπρου και εμπόδισαν εξέδρα της ιταλικής εταιρείας ΕΝΙ να πραγματοποιήσει προγραμματισμένες γεωτρήσεις.
Την Πέμπτη 1η Μαρτίου 2018 δύο Έλληνες στρατιωτικοί συλλαμβάνονται από τους Τούρκους στον Έβρο με την κατηγορία ότι εισήλθαν παρανόμως σε τουρκικό έδαφος. Οι δύο στρατιωτικοί κρατούνται στην Ανδριανούπολη.
Την ίδια χρονική περίοδο η Τουρκία επιχειρεί με στρατιωτικές της δυνάμεις σε επαρχία της Συρίας, έχει δηλαδή εισβάλει σε έδαφος άλλης χώρας.
Ο Πρόεδρος της Τουρκίας κ. Ερντογάν έχει επανειλημμένα δηλώσει ότι η συνθήκη της Λωζάννης έχει σημεία που χρειάζονται αναθεώρηση και έχει πει χαρακτηριστικά: «όταν αλλάζουν τα πάντα, δεν μπορούμε να βρισκόμαστε στο σημείο που βρεθήκαμε τότε (στα σύνορα που χάραξε η συνθήκη της Λωζάννης).»
Η Ελλάδα και η Κύπρος δεν φαίνεται να μπορούν να διαχειριστούν την νέα κατάσταση πραγμάτων με την Τουρκία, παραμένοντας καθηλωμένες σε παλιά και ξεπερασμένα πρότυπα εξωτερικής πολιτικής.
Δεν θα αναφερθώ περαιτέρω στην Κύπρο, αφού η ρίζα της αμοιβαία ανεπαρκούς πολιτικής βρίσκεται στην Ελλάδα.
Η εξωτερική πολιτική που ακολουθεί η Ελλάδα στο θέμα της Τουρκίας δεν είναι τίποτε περισσότερο από μια αδέξια εκλογίκευση του συνδρόμου της κατωτερότητας που διακρίνει την Ελλάδα από το τέλος του Β’ Παγκόσμιου Πόλεμου. Τότε η Ελλάδα ήτανε μια διαλυμένη χώρα, με εμφανή τα σημάδια του εμφυλίου πολέμου, και με ένα πληθυσμό που είχε υποφέρει τα πάνδεινα και κοίταζε να βρει τρόπο να επιβιώσει.
Η χώρα επιβίωσε χάρη στο δόγμα Τρούμαν αλλά μπήκε στο πεδίο των διεθνών σχέσεων με σκυμμένο το κεφάλι, σαν τον φτωχό συγγενή. Το αντίθετο ακριβώς έπραξε η Τουρκία, που μπήκε στο νέο πεδίο διεθνών σχέσεων αποφασισμένη να διεκδικήσει τα πάντα, στηριγμένη πάνω στην στρατηγική της θέση το υπογάστριο της τότε Σοβιετικής Ένωσης.
Η τεράστια ήττα που υπέστη η Ελλάδα το 1974 στην Κύπρο ήρθε σαν η πιο συντριπτική υπενθύμιση ότι η εξωτερική πολιτική και οι ένοπλες δυνάμεις της χώρας είναι πολύ σοβαρές υποθέσεις που δεν αντιμετωπίζονται με τον αυτόματο πιλότο της πολιτικής της κατωτερότητας. Το 1974 είναι το ισχυρότερο πλήγμα που δέχθηκε η Ελλάδα στο διεθνή στίβο μετά το 1922. Και τα δύο από την Τουρκία.
44 χρόνια μετά, τα πράγματα έχουν αλλάξει ριζικά. Οι παλιές μέθοδοι, τρόποι, πολιτικές είναι ξεπερασμένες από την ίδια την ζωή. Η Τουρκία που έχουμε απέναντι μας είναι μια διαφορετική Τουρκία.
Στην Ελλάδα όμως εξακολουθεί να υπερισχύει η πολιτική της κατωτερότητας. Χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα η ανακοίνωση του Γενικού Επιτελείου Στρατού (ΓΕΣ) για τους δύο στρατιωτικούς που συνελήφθησαν από τους Τούρκους στον Έβρο, όπου αναφέρεται: «φέρεται να εντοπίστηκε (η ελληνική περίπολος) από τουρκική περίπολο, σε τουρκικό έδαφος» . Αν είναι ποτέ δυνατόν να σκάβουμε εμείς οι ίδιοι τον λάκκο μας! Γιατί ο συντάκτης της ανακοίνωσης χρησιμοποιεί την τουρκική εκδοχή των γεγονότων; Απίστευτα πράγματα! Πότε πρόλαβαν και πώς πιστοποίησαν οι επιτελείς του ΓΕΣ ότι οι Έλληνες στρατιωτικοί ήσαν σε τουρκικό έδαφος;
Από το τελευταίο αυτό συμβάν προκύπτει ότι η πολιτική της κατωτερότητας δεν παρέμεινε περιορισμένη στην εξωτερική πολιτική, αλλά όπως είναι φυσικό, επεκτάθηκε και στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις.
Η Τουρκία δεν είναι πια ένα Κεμαλικό κράτος. Με Πρόεδρο τον κ. Ερντογάν ονειρεύεται κάποιου είδους αναβίωση της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας. Η συσσώρευση των γεγονότων που ανέφερα στην εισαγωγή δεν είναι τυχαία ούτε ως προς την φύση της ούτε ως προς τον χρονισμό της. Με ανοιχτά μέτωπα στρατιωτικής επέμβασης στην Συρία και τις βλέψεις της στο Αιγαίο και την Θράκη, η Τουρκία δεν παύει ούτε στιγμή να διακηρύσσει τις προθέσεις της. Είναι χαρακτηριστικό ότι κ. Ερντογάν έχει δηλώσει ότι η Τουρκία μπορεί να συντηρήσει πολλαπλά ενεργά στρατιωτικά μέτωπα στη Συρία, το Αιγαίο και όπου αλλού χρειαστεί.
Η Ελλάδα δεν έχει την πολυτέλεια να παραβλέπει την αδυσώπητη πραγματικότητα: κανείς δεν πρόκειται να διασφαλίσει την εθνική μας ανεξαρτησία και εδαφική ακεραιότητα, παρά μόνον εμείς οι ίδιοι, με επικεφαλής μια πολιτική ηγεσία που δεν φοβάται την πολεμική αναμέτρηση, και με ένοπλες δυνάμεις που μπορούν να αξιοποιήσουν τα πλεονεκτήματα μας.
Η πραγματική φιλειρηνική πολιτική είναι εκείνη που στηρίζεται πάνω στην ικανότητα μιας χώρας να πολεμήσει. Όλα τα άλλα είναι λόγια του αέρα.
Χρειάζεται λοιπόν μια νέα πολιτική η Ελλάδα για να μπορέσει να σταθεί όρθια απέναντι στην λαίλαπα που έχει ήδη προκαλέσει ο κ. Ερντογάν.
Μια νέα πολιτική που να στηρίζεται στην στρατιωτική και διπλωματική ικανότητα της Ελλάδας.
Αυτό σημαίνει ότι θα πρέπει να φτιάξουμε ένα πρόγραμμα πραγματικής ανανέωσης του υλικού και των όπλων των ενόπλων δυνάμεων. Σαν παράδειγμα θα αναφέρω την πολεμική μας αεροπορία. Η πολιτική της κατωτερότητας οδήγησε την ελληνική πολιτική ηγεσία σε ένα πρόγραμμα «εκσυγχρονισμού» του στόλου των μαχητικών αεροσκαφών F-16. Την ίδια στιγμή που η Ελλάδα ετοιμάζει αυτό το κακομοίρικο πρόγραμμα για να μπαλώσει τις τρύπες στα μαχητικά της αεροσκάφη, η Τουρκία ετοιμάζεται να παραλάβει τα πρώτα υπερσύγχρονα F-35.
Αυτό το παράδειγμα τα λέει όλα.
Και η πολιτική ηγεσία της Ελλάδας πρέπει να αλλάξει πορεία τόσο στην εξωτερική πολιτική όσο και την πολιτική στον τομέα των ενόπλων δυνάμεων.
Στον κάλαθο των αχρήστων τα μπαλώματα και η κακομοιριά, στο τραπέζι των διαπραγματεύσεων με τους συμμάχους μας το πρόγραμμα για τα υπερσύγχρονα F-35.
Το υπουργείο Εξωτερικών είναι ο χώρος στον οποίο θα πρέπει να πραγματοποιηθεί η πρώτη μεγάλη αλλαγή πολιτικής. Η δεύτερη μεγάλη αλλαγή θα πρέπει να πραγματοποιηθεί στον χώρο των εξοπλισμών των ενόπλων δυνάμεων.
Αυτή είναι η μεγάλη πρόκληση που έχει μπροστά του ο κ. Τσίπρας. Περιμένω με αγωνία να δω πως θα την αντιμετωπίσει. Αυτό που παίζεται στη σκακιέρα είναι η εθνική ακεραιότητα της Ελλάδας. Και αυτή σήμερα κινδυνεύει από τον κ. Ερντογάν και ο κίνδυνος αυτός ολοένα μεγαλώνει. Ο κ. Σημίτης το 1996 κινδύνεψε να γίνει ο πρώτος Έλληνας δημοκρατικά εκλεγμένος Πρωθυπουργός μετά τον Β’ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο που απώλεσε τμήμα της εθνικής επικράτειας. Ο κ. Τσίπρας θα πρέπει να προσέξει ώστε να μην βρεθεί ανήμπορος και μοιραίος σε αντίστοιχη θέση.
There is no doubt that in the face of Mr. Erdogan Greece has a formidable neighbour. Some call him a foe, an enemy, others call him an authoritatirian leader, others call him the leader of the new Turkey in the 21st century, but the bottom line is that Mr. Erdogan is powerful and a capable negotiator in every front.
The mistake sentimentalists usually make is that they put forward sentiments, like fear, admiration, rather than the interests of the side they belong to.
The same happens with the moralists and the legalists, who put forward moralissues and judgements or legal issues.
But the issues that Greece is faced with when attempting to manage its relationship with Turkey is not primarily sentimental, or legal, or moral. It is quite simply a question of protecting and advancing its interests. After all, this is what sovereign states are all about.
So, what is Greece doing to protect and advance its interests, in the face of the Turkey of Mr. Erdogan?
Sadly, not enough.
First of all, there appears to be a complete loss when it comes to priorities. The issue of the name of a small neighbouring country has dominated the psyche of the populace, and there have been two massive demonstrations in Thessalonica and Athens.
It is not a secret that you cannot win anything in a situation where you get your priorities wrong.
The political leadership of Greece with the exception of SYRIZA and the Communist Party, has followed the flow of the masses. The same applies to the Church, which is powerful in Greece. They simply went along.
All this while Turkey under the relentless leadership of Mr. Erdogan is becoming more and more assertive in its demands on what they consider disputed sovereign territory in the Aegean (the islets of Imia) and the Exclusive Economic Zones of Cyprus.
To add insult to injury, the Greek Parliament has decided to initiate legal proceedings to determine the culpability of 10 politicians – including two ex prime ministers – in the investigation of the business practices of the pharmaceuticals firm Novartis.
When the Greeks should be working together, day and night, to figure out what to do with Turkey and the economy, the crowds take the streets to demonstrate that “Macedonia” is Greek, and the governing party of SYRIZA goes after its political opponents in the Novartis case.
I am not a person who could even remotely claim to have the answers to the questions regarding the Greek – Turkish relationships. But from my professional experience I know that this is the supreme sovereignty issue for the Greek State and that a divided country cannot negotiate, cannot set the correct policies, cannot achieve goals and objectives beneficial to the country.
Unless something changes in the very near future, the Greeks will continue to engage in a fracticidal feud, and worry about the small neighbouring country to the North, and the drugs of Novartis, while Mr. Erdogan and his leadership team pursue with determination and tencity their national interests.
It is a situation that makes me extremely nervous and worried.
Around 2300 hrs in the night of 12th February 2018, a Turkish patrol boat attempted to ram a Greek coast guard vessel near the islets of Imia, in Dodekanese.
I saw the video clip taken from the greek vessel and it is freightening. Crew members of the Greek ship were saying that they were certain that the Turkish vessel would hit them real hard.
The reason the Greek vessel escaped with a few scratches only is that the captain manouvered just in time and thus the angle of the collision was less than 20 degrees, minimizing the impact and the damage.
Following the incident, the Turkish Mistry of Foreign Affairs issued a communique stating that the islets of Imia are Turkish territory and Greece should stay away. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded trying to say that Immia are Greek territory, but did not say it clear enough.
At around the same time, Turkish ships blocked a drilling rig from reaching an area off Cyprus and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Tuesday issued a warning to neighboring Greece and Cyprus as well as foreign companies not to encroach on Turkey’s sovereignty.
Turkey is becoming more of a problem than Greece would like and it is clear that Greece is ambivalent. On one hand Greece avoids any confrontation and claims that Turkey is violating International Law, on the other there are voices saying that enough is enough.
Since the relevant incident of 1996 the islets of Imia have de facto become a “no go” territory for Greece, no matter what. The recent incident signals Turkey’s intention to broaden the enforcement of this informal blockade.
An explanation of Turkey’s behavior is that Mr. Erdogan is under pressure by the opposition and seeks to score points in the international arena by invading Syria and playing tough with Greece and Turkey. The proponents of this explanation claim that Mr. Erdogan does not intend do commit any real aggression, he is only talking about it. In other words, he is bluffing.
However, other than Greece itself, there is no other entity to prevent Mr. Erdogan from actually committing an act of aggression against Greece. Although Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO, should Turkey commit an act of aggression against Greece, NATO is not going to intervene and protect Greece. The US State Department is on the fence when it comes to the Greek-Turkish problem. They always say to Greece and Turkey “sort it out”, without taking sides. There is no reason why this position should change now. Especially as Mr. Tilerson has just negotiated a “joint” approach with Turkey in Syria. Greece is a member of the European Union, and Turkey is not. But Turkey has recently made it clear that joining the EU is not their priority, as a matter of fact Mr. Erdogan could not care less. He seems to be able to score more points being outside the EU, rather than being on the path to join. In addition, the EU has no military capabilities as such. Therefore, although an aggression against Greece is also an aggression against the EU, no one will do anything about it, other than talk the usual talk about International Law and so on.
Whether it is done for internal consumption or not, the fact remains that Mr. Erdogan can only gain from an act of aggression against Greece. I assume that there will be no civilians involved, and that the military engagement will be short in duration and contained in territorial terms. The symbolic value of such a potential aggression is huge. This is the reason why I assert that an aggression against Greece may materialize in the very near future.
The only negative aspect of such an event might be the response of the Greek Armed Forces.Mr. Erdogan has recently downplayed the capabilities of the Greek Armed Forces, claiming that they play tough as long as the Turkish forces are at a safe distance, but then they chicken out as soon as the Turkish fighter jets, ships and troops are within site. There is no secret that the huge economic problems that Greece is facing have had an impact on its military forces. It would be naive to assume otherwise. However, we are not talking about full scale prolonged war here, we are talking about a short and contained act of aggression. Agility, timing, risk taking, are the factors that matter rather than size and fire power.
Therefore, Mr. Erdogan may be making a mistake assuming that an act of aggression against Greece will remain unanswered.
In light of all the above, I assert that the best course of action for Greece is to call Mr. Erdogan’s bluff. Next time Turkish forces attempt to engage with Greek forces, they should face a surprise. The Greek Armed Forces can deliver a blow to Turkish Forces and they know it. It is only a matter of political approval of the engagement plans.
Calling Mr. Erdogan’s bluff in a successful way is going to have many benefits for Greece.
It will force Mr. Erdogan to rethink his approach and potentially adopt a less aggressive approach
It will bring military spending back to the agenda of Greek politics. It is time to proceed with bold procurement plans of the Greek Armed Forces. As an example, Greece should procure F-35 fighter jets rather than “modernize” its aging F-16 fleet.
It will encourage Greece to be more aggressive with the EU when it comes to violations of its territory. The EU should not be left to sit on the fence for much longer.
It will encourage Greece to be more assertive when it comes to its US relationship. This is especially important as it relates to placing various procurement orders for the Armed Forces.
This is a post about kokoretsi, the offal delicacy, grilled on charcoal. The challenge is that on this occasion there is no spit.
Περίληψη
Αυτό το άρθρο έχει θέμα του το ψήσιμο του κοκορετσιού στα κάρβουνα. Η πρόκληση προέρχεται από το ότι το κοκορέτσι δεν έχει περαστεί σε σούβλα, αλλά είναι σε δίχτυ.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
“Εκ του τέλους άρχεσθαι” Άγνωστος Σύγχρονος Φιλόσοφος
Ο Galip Tokoz, ιδιοκτήτης της αλυσίδας ταχυφαγείων Sampiyon Kokorec, δήλωσε σε δημοσιογράφο εφημερίδας: «Το κοκορέτσι είναι για τους Τούρκους σαν την μορφίνη».
Αγαπημένο το κοκορέτσι και στην Ελλάδα μας. Σύμφωνα με διάφορα άρθρα που διαβάζω στο διαδίκτυο, το έτρωγαν και οι Αρχαίοι Έλληνες χιλιάδες χρόνια πριν. Ένα άρθρο αναφέρει ότι στον Όμηρο το κοκορέτσι είναι η «πλεκτή». Στο έγκυρο λεξικό Liddell-Scott όμως αναφέρεται ως σπείρα, συστροφή, σχοινί, κορδόνι.
Άλλη μια λέξη που αναφέρεται ότι είναι το κοκορέτσι στην αρχαία ελληνική είναι «μίμαρκυν». Στο ίδιο λεξικό όμως η λέξη «μίμαρκυς» ορίζεται σαν λαγός σε σούπα ή στο ίδιο του το αίμα, με αναφορά στους Αχαρνείς του Αριστοφάνη.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
Δύσκολο λοιπόν το να βρεις την άκρη με τους αρχαίους Έλληνες και το κοκορέτσι. Όχι τόσο δύσκολο όμως για τους σύγχρονους. Μαζί με τους Τούρκους και τους Αλβανούς είμαστε σήμερα οι μόνοι που τρώμε κοκορέτσι.
Σύμφωνα με τον καθηγητή Μπαμπινιώτη, η λέξη κοκορέτσι προέρχεται από την αλβανική kukurec. Η αλβανική καταγωγή αναφέρεται και από την «That Best Bite» που αναφέρει ότι το κοκορέτσι μπήκε μαζικά στην Τουρκική αγορά ταχυφαγείων στη δεκαετία του 1960, όταν πολλοί Αλβανοί δούλευαν στην κρεαταγορά της Κωνσταντινούπολης.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
Πρόσφατα έψησα για πρώτη φορά ένα κοκορέτσι στο δίχτυ στα κάρβουνα, γιατί η ψησταριά ήτανε μικρή και δεν χωρούσε σούβλα. Είχα τόσο μεγάλη αγωνία για το τελικό αποτέλεσμα, που αποθανάτισα το ψήσιμο και έτσι προέκυψε αυτό το χρονικό. Η αγωνία είναι εν μέρει δικαιολογημένη, αφού μέχρι τώρα δεν είχα ψήσει ποτέ κοκορέτσι στο δίχτυ στα κάρβουνα.
Το κοκορέτσι το έφτιαξε ο ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ, ένα εξαιρετικό κρεοπωλείο στη στενή Ευβοίας, από όπου προμηθεύομαι τα κρεατικά μου. Ζύγιζε 3 κιλά όταν το πήρα. Αφού στράγγιξε καλά ολονυκτίς, ήτανε έτοιμο για ψήσιμο. Πριν το βάλω στην φωτιά το αλάτισα και πιπέρισα ελαφρά. Όταν η πρώτη ύλη είναι υψηλής ποιότητας, πρέπει να διαφυλαχθεί ως κόρη οφθαλμού η πραγματική γεύση και τα αρώματα της, χωρίς διαστρεβλώσεις.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
Η αρχή του ψησίματος έχει ένα βασικό σκοπό. Να «ιδρώσει» το κοκορέτσι χωρίς να καεί. Αυτό σημαίνει δυνατή φωτιά, αλλά και αρκετή απόσταση από τη φωτιά, με δεδομένο ότι δεν έχεις την ευχέρεια να γυρίζεις το κοκορέτσι συνέχεια, αλλά μόνο κάθε 5 λεπτά περίπου. Το χρώμα είναι πολύ ανοικτό.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
Μετά από 20 λεπτά το χρώμα έχει αρχίζει να αλλάζει, ενώ έχει αρχίσει να στάζει. Το στάξιμο το σημάδι ότι η θερμοκρασία είναι η σωστή. Όσο περνάει η ώρα το χρώμα σκουραίνει, ενώ αρχίζει και η ευωδία από τις σταγόνες που πέφτουν στα κάρβουνα και εξαερώνονται σκορπίζοντας εκατομμύρια σωματίδια στον αέρα. Στο χρονικό αυτό σημείο πρέπει να μειωθεί η απόσταση από τη φωτιά, ενώ η συχνότητα γυρίσματος γίνεται 10 από πέντε λεπτά.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
60 λεπτά. Αρχίζει να μελώνει. Αυτό που βλέπετε στην επάνω μεριά είναι μια κρούστα γεμάτη νοστιμιά. Με την πρόοδο του ψησίματος βλέπετε και την αισθητή μείωση της διαμέτρου του κοκορετσιού. Καλό σημάδι, και απόδειξη της φρεσκάδας των υλικών. Προσθέτω κάρβουνα στη φωτιά, όχι πολλά, ο στόχος είναι η συντήρηση και όχι η ενίσχυση.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
120 λεπτά. Η θερμοκρασία έχει ανέβει πολύ, και αρχίζει να σκουραίνει το έντερο, με την εμφάνιση του φαινομένου Maillard. Η κρούστα επεκτείνεται, το χρώμα σκουραίνει ακόμη περισσότερο.
Το φαινόμενο Maillard είναι στην ουσία ο γάμος μορίων υδρογονάνθρακα με αμινοξέα, στον οποίο προστίθενται και μόρια νατρίου και θείου. Το σκούρο καφέ χρώμα και η έντονη μεστή γεύση (umami) οφείλονται σε αυτό το φαινόμενο. Το φαινόμενο για να εμφανισθεί απαιτούνται θερμοκρασίες πάνω από 120 βαθμούς Κελσίου. Αν σκεφτούμε ότι το νερό βράζει στους 100 βαθμούς, έχουμε την εξήγηση γιατί τα βραστά φαγητά ή τα φαγητά χύτρας δεν έχουν σκούρο χρώμα, παρεκτός εάν έχουμε προηγούμενα τσιγαρίσει τα υλικά.
Όπως έχει πει ο κάτοχος βραβείου Νόμπελ στη Χημεία Jean-Marie Lehn, «Το φαινόμενο Maillard είναι η πιο διαδεδομένη εφαρμοσμένη χημική αντίδραση στον κόσμο.»
Προσθέτω κάρβουνα στη φωτιά.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
160 λεπτά. Το καραμέλωμα έχει απλωθεί παντού. Το μόνο που μένει τώρα είναι να γίνει τραγανό το έντερο στην εξωτερική επιφάνεια, χωρίς όμως να στεγνώσει μέσα.
180 λεπτά. Το τέλος του ψησίματος. 3 ώρες, για 3 κιλά.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
Προσέξτε πόσο έχει μικρύνει η διάμετρος! Επίσης, πόσο λεπτή είναι η «φλούδα» με τα έντερα. Και έτσι πρέπει στο κοκορέτσι με φρέσκα υλικά. Σε πολλές ταβέρνες βρίσκω κοκορέτσι τεραστίων διαστάσεων με μια φλούδα έντερα περίπου μισό πόντο. Αυτό δεν μου αρέσει, και «μυρίζει» κατεψυγμένα έντερα από την Ισπανία και εντόσθια από πολύ μεγάλα ζώα. Το σωστό κοκορέτσι όμως θέλει εντόσθια από μικρό (κάτω του 12μηνου) ζώο και φρέσκα έντερα.
Kokoretsi – Photo: N. Moropoulos
Το αποτέλεσμα της διαδικασίας είναι – χωρίς μετριοφροσύνη – εξαιρετικό. Τα έντερα τραγανά έξω, ζουμερά μέσα, τα εντόσθια γεμάτα χυμούς και αρώματα. Το αλάνθαστο τεστ, το λίπος, είναι γλυκό και δεν σε μπουκώνει. Όσο καλύτερο το ζώο, τόσο καλύτερο και το λίπος του. Το ίδιο ισχύει και για τα γλυκάδια, τα οποία όπως λέει και το όνομα τους είναι γλύκισμα. Τα εντόσθια γεμάτα νοστιμιά.
Μπράβο στον ΛΑΜΠΡΟ που έχει τέτοια ποιότητα, μπράβο και στον ψήστη που ολοκλήρωσε την αποστολή του! Ζήτω το κοκορέτσι! Και την επόμενη φορά ένδοξο σπληνάντερο! Και γαρδούμπες!
The migrant crisis has reached an acute state in Greece and Europe for more than one year now. Millions of people from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries are flooding Greece aiming to continue their journey to other European countries. Some 45,000 of them are now stuck in Greece, after the northern borders of the country have been closed. Approximately 14,000 of them are in the area of Idomeni, a village of 150 inhabitants.
Photo: Hundreds of people arrive at the passport office in Kabul to apply for new travel documents. SLOBODAN LEKIC/Stars and Stripes
Images of the migrants stuck in Greece near the border with FYROM (Macedonia) are all over the news. On the 17th March 2016 the EU leaders met and finalized the EU proposal to Turkey to stem the flow of migrants to Europe. An agreement was reached with Turkey on the 18th March 2016. According to the agreement, every migrant arriving in Greece after the 20th March 2016 who does not qualify for asylum in a European country will be returned to Turkey. In exchange, a Syrian refuge who is in Turkey and has not attempted to cross illegally to Greece, will be given asylum to a European country. There is a cap to this, of 72,000 people. There are significant implementation issues for the agreement to run smoothly. However, the big question remain: “Can the flow of migrants from the Middle East to Europe be stemmed?”
It is obvious that the European leaders and their advisors think that the flow can be stemmed. The deal with Turkey is structured on the basis of this hypothesis. Why is this the case? How can this be proven to be a reasonable assumption?
Quite simply put, the flow can be stemmed provided that the causes of the massive migration can be addressed so that migration is no longer the path to the future for millions of people. It is therefore essential that we know which are the causes of the migration, and that we examine how they can ills behind creating them can be cured.
The war in Syria has made the whole phenomenon look like a mass exodus of people from the battlefields of the Syrian war. This is the explanation that best suits the European Union’s agenda. The war stops, therefore the migration flow declines and eventually stops. All we need – in this case – is to stem the flow from Turkey to Europe and wait until the flow stops.
Photo: Boy on a destroyed tank in Kobane, Syria. Yasin Akgul/AFP/Getty Images
Before I proceed I would like to clarify the terminology. Following the BBC, I use the terms migrant and migration to describe the phenomenon. I suggest that the word refugee is not needed, as it creates confusion and obfuscates the phenomenon at large. A migrant is a person who decides to leave their country of residence in order to move to another country. No matter what the reason is, political persecution, economic need, or something else, the migrant is a man determined to move and seek asylum in another country.
The confusion with the terminology arose out of the need qualify a migrant as a refugee in case the reason for their decision is political persecution.Being a refugee qualifies the migrant for automatic granting of asylum by the receiving country, whereas a simple migrant who, say, emigrates in order to make a living (so called financial refugees) has no right to asylum whatsoever and is not accepted.
In order to establish the causes of the phenomenon, we must make sure we have the facts relevant to it. Lets begin with the country of origin.Where do the migrants come from?
The origin countries
According to Frontex, there were 1.83 million “illegal border crossings” into Europe in 2015 compared to the previous year’s record of 283,500. As we see in the Eurostat chart above, the three top origin countries of the migrants are Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. A total of 363,000 Syrians fled the war and entered Europe seeking asylum.
So far we have established one probable cause for the migration. The war in Syria. Assuming that this is the only cause, we have an issue to deal with in our analysis. How do we explain the migration from Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of the war in Syria?
Before addressing this issue it would be useful to gather some facts on the migration from Afghanistan and Iraq.
Afghan refugees walk through a beach where they will wait to board a dinghy sailing off for the Greek island of Chios, while they try to travel from the western Turkish coastal town of Cesme, in Izmir province, Turkey, March 6, 2016. REUTERS/Umit Bektas
Afghanistan
The Afghanistan population is approximately 33 million. Male life expectancy is 59 years, and female 61 years. Unemployment is over 50%, while 38% of the population lives below the poverty demarcation line.Afghanistan is practically a country whose economy is destroyed and more than one third of its territory is under the control of the Taliban insurgents.
Eurostat figures show that 178,000 Afghanis entered Europe in 2015 seeking a better life.
Slobodan Lekic writes in “Stars and Stripes”:
“Afghans are now the second-largest contingent of migrants heading for Europe, after Syrians but ahead of Iraqis fleeing from the murderous Islamic State jihadis in the Middle East, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the European Union’s statistical agency. But exact numbers are difficult to come by because many of the Afghans heading east have already been living as refugees outside Afghanistan’s borders. A good proportion of those traveling to Europe live in Iran, where some 900,000 Afghans have resided since the 1990s.”(1)
Dasha Afanasieva reports on the Afghanis in Turkey:
“The EU is not even discussing these issues and is exclusively focused on Syria,” Kati Piri, the European Parliament’s rapporteur for Turkey, told Reuters last month.
“Even if the Syrian crisis would be solved tomorrow, there would still be a serious refugee crisis, with a large number of refugees in Turkey who don’t have access to their rights.”
Afghan migrants in Turkey interviewed by Reuters said that over the past few years they had been denied interviews with U.N. refugee agency UNHCR that would formally determine their refugee status, a key step in the journey to being resettled.
Polat Kizildag, program coordinator at ASAM, an organization which registers asylum seekers in Turkey, said they were generally told they were ineligible because Turkey was the third country on their journey and the expectation was that they apply for refugee status in their second, in many cases Iran.
Human rights groups have said Iranian forces deport thousands of Afghans without giving them a chance to prove their asylum status and that they are pressured to leave the country.
“More than 63,000 Afghans came to Turkey last year, a sharp rise from 15,652 in 2014, according to ASAM (an organization which registers asylum seekers in Turkey), counting only those who registered. Some came directly from Afghanistan, others from Iran, where they had tried unsuccessfully to settle.(6)
Iraq
Iraq has a population of approximately 37 million people and its oil dependent economy is in a terrible shape. In her NPR report, Alice Fordham says:
“Everything seems to be working against the Iraqi economy. The government is waging a costly war with the Islamic State while dealing with falling oil prices, millions of displaced citizens and staggering costs for reconstruction of cities ruined by fighting.” (7)
Add to this the effects of the civil strife and you have the makings of an explosive situation. According to a report by the International Organization for Migration, more than 3 million people have been displaced in Iraq by violent conflict since January 2014. Dominik Bartsch, the U.N.’s deputy humanitarian coordinator in Iraq, said 10 million people were expected to need humanitarian support by the end of the year in that country, where 3.2 million were already displaced. (4)
In the past years there has been migration within the region, which is now becoming migration to Europe. In a New York Times article, Ken Arango wrote in September 2015:
“Adnan al-Azzawi, 45, was in Damascus, Syria, from 2004 to 2011, and then returned to Baghdad. He recently sent his family on the migrant journey, and they wound up in Belgium. He hopes to join them soon.” (3)
The mix of the origin countries is changing
Since September 2015, the mix of migrants by country of origin has changed significantly. The extensive quote below is from Chris Tomlinson’s article (5):
The number of Syrian migrants is falling, while the number of Afghans, Iraqis and West Africans continues to grow, according to the European Union’s (EU) Frontex agency.
The organisation, which is tasked with monitoring and controlling movements around Europe’s borders, has revealed that the new wave of migrants aren’t necessarily fleeing conflict, but rather “aspiring” for a better economic situation, according to two agency reports.
The first document talks about migration coming through the Greek islands from the Middle East. They state that in recent months the percentage of Syrian migrants is decreasing.
According to the agency, although Syrians represented 56 percent of the illegal migrants that crossed into Greece in 2015, by December that number had fell to 39 percent.
The report also said that Iraqis and Afghanis as a percentage of the migrants had dramatically increased with the share of Iraqis more than doubling from 11 percent in October to 25 percent by the end of December. Afghani numbers also have increased to one third of migrants crossing into Greece.
Photo: The Aigli Hotel, a bankrupt resort near Thermopylae Greece, is now an official migrant center. Sergey Ponomarev for the New York Times.
First conclusions
What we can conclude from the Iraqi situation is that the tide of migrants will become stronger. When 10 million people are displaced and in danger of their well being, the tide will not only be big, it may also be unstoppable.
If the findings of the Frontex reports are valid, the wave of migrants from the Middle East to Europe will continue to come strong, contrary to the views that it will stop once the Syrian war is over. The reasons behind the migration are not restricted to the geographical territory of Syria, nor are they confined to fully blown war. There is an intense feeling of insecurity both in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this feeling is not going away if we believe the relevant reports.
If insecurity drives the migration, this is not strictly a political issue. It is also an economic issue, and it is related to demographics.
Given all of the above, the migration crisis facing the Middle East and Europe is here to stay. And this raises a lot of questions regarding the adequacy of the EU – Turkey agreement regarding the flow of migrants. If the migration tide is not just the result of a war in Syria that is going to end, what are the chances that an agreement to control the flow of migrants from Turkey to the EU will prove to be totally inadequate?
European politicians have developed a piecemeal approach to tackle issues, no matter how big or small they are. As the collapse of the American financial system in 2008 has shown us, piecemeal measures do not work when the issue is a big crisis that transcends the ordinary. The Europeans do not seem to have learned this lesson. If we judge from the way the Greek crisis is being handled, the piecemeal approach thrives.
Is this going to work in the migrant crisis facing Europe? I do not think so. A year from now the situation in Greece will be intollerable, with many more migrants stuck in the country unable to move either to Europe or back to Turkey. The northern borders of Greece will continue to be closed for the migrants.
And what is the worst of all, the economic conditions that make migration inevitable also fuel insurgency in the Middle East.
Sources
(1) Afghans join Syrians, others migrating to Europe, by Slobodan Lekic. Stars and Stripes. Published: September 18, 2015.
Today’s dish is a variance of a classic: vine leafs stuffed with minced beef.
Before I proceed with the dish, there are some clarifications required on the words used to name the dish.
Literally speaking, the vine leafs are not “stuffed”. They are “wrapped”.
Vine leafs – detail
The Turkish word for stuffed is “dolma”. We find the same word in Persia. In Arabic though, stuffed is “mahshi”. The relevant word in Armenian is “tolma”.
The Turkish word for wrapped is “sarma”.
And the Turkish word for leaf is “yaprak”. The same word is used in Persia and Albania.
In Greek we use all three words: ντολμαδες (dolma) σαρμαδακια (sarma), γιαπρακια (yaprak).
Minced beef, lemon zest, parsley and coriander
Having somehow sorted out the vocabulary, lets turn to the cooking.
I blanche the vine leafs, 5 seconds each, and let them rest without placing them in a cold bath.
I like the stuffing to be minced beef with parsley, coriander, lemon zest, sauteed chopped onions and a handful of bulgur wheat.
I do not like to add rice to the stuffing.
Stuffing
I sautee the onions but not brown them, let them rest, drain them, and then add them to the minced meat mix.
Ater the stuffing has rested for about 30 minutes in the fridge, I wrap the vine leafs and place them over medium heat, adding a moderate amount of the onion liquids.
While the “yaprak” are cooking slowly, I take thin slices of tender beef pastirma, remove the paste covering it (cemen), and chop them.
Stuffed vine leafs
The paste is the best ingredient to spice up the fresh yogourt that will accompany the “yaprak”.
After 45 minutes the “yaprak” are ready.
I remove from the heat and let them rest for 30 minutes.
Stuffed vine leafs with spicy yogourt and chopped pastirma
I serve the “yaprak” on a bed of the spicy yogourt, and sprinkle over them the chopped pastirma.
A medium bodied red is the best wine to accompany this dish. Enjoy it.
Το Σαλέπι είναι ένα ρόφημα θερμαντικό, προέρχεται από «αλεύρι» που λαμβάνεται από τους ξηρούς κονδύλους της ορχιδέας γνωστής ως Orchis mascula. Στις ορχιδέες αυτές και στις θεραπευτικές ιδιότητες τους, αναφέρεται ο Ιπποκράτης, αλλά και ο Ασκληπιός.
Η ορχιδέα αυτή φύεται και καλλιεργείται στα ψηλά βουνά των Βαλκανίων και της Μέσης Ανατολής.
Λέγεται ότι τό σαλέπι από τό βουνό Κόζιακα Τρικαλων, κοντα στο Νεραϊδοχώρι, είναι τό καλύτερο.
Τά παλιά τά χρόνια οι σαλεπιτζήδες τής περιοχής έφταναν μέχρι Κωνσταντινούπολη γιά νά τό πουλήσουν.
Αντιστοιχα λεγονται και για το σαλεπι απο τον Ολυμπο.
Σαλεπιτζης στην Κατερινη
Το σαλεπι είναι γνωστό από την αρχαιότητα, καθώς κατά την ελληνική μυθολογία ο Ορχις ήταν γιος μιας νύμφης και ενός σάτυρου. Κατά τη διάρκεια των εορτών προς τιμήν του Βάκχου, διέπραξε ιεροσυλία, επιχειρώντας να βιάσει μια ιέρεια. Η τιμωρία του ήταν να κατασπαραχθεί από άγρια θηρία και να μεταμορφωθεί σε ένα αδύνατο και σεμνό φυτό.
Στο σαλεπι αποδιδονται και ιδιότητες αφροδισιακές, γι’ αυτό και εχει περασει στη λαϊκή παράδοση ως Σερνικοβότανο.
Εις τα ετη της νεοτητος μου καταληγαμε ως παρεα στην πλατεια Ομονοιας τις πρωτες πρωϊνες ωρες.
Μετα τον πατροπαραδοτο πατσα ή τα ποδαρακια σουπα, το ροφημα που θεραπευε το σωμα απο την κραιπαλη τα οινοπνευματα τις νικοτινες και ολα τα αλλα ηταν η κολλωδης ουσια που ονομαστηκε σαλεπι.
Οι πωλητες ητανε κομματια κι αποσπασματα της εμπειριας.
Προσωπογραφιες του Ρεμπραντ της Ανατολης, χαραγμενα προσωπα μουστακαλιδικα, ανεκφραστα, με μια προσηλωση στο εργο του σερβιρισματος και το βλεμμα στην ασφαλτο.
Σαλεπιτζης
Ειχα την τυχη να προλαβω τα γυαλινα ποτηρακια που – με αγνωστο τροπο – σερβιρανε την πλειαδα των πελατων.
Εζησα ομως και την μεταβαση στα πλαστικα, που αποτελει και το τελος μιας εποχης.
Πιο υγιεινα μεν, απροσωπα δε.
Καποια στιγμη θα πρεπει να γραψω και για το προσωπο ενος ποτηριου.
Νεραϊδοχώρι Τρικάλων
Εχει σημασια.
Η τελευται φορα που γευτηκα το υπεροχο ροφημα ητανε στην Πολη, πριν απο τεσσερα χρονια.
Hasan Tahsin Pasha (1845–1918) was the Ottoman Commander of the 8th Army Corps who in October 1912 handed Thessaloniki over to the Greeks.
He did so without firing a shot.
He has been called a traitor, condemned to death by the Ottoman military court in Istanbul, and suffered the indignity of spending his last years as an exile.
On the other hand, he is considered to be a hero because he spared the city of Thessaloniki the damages and destruction of war.
Before we arrive at any conclusions though, let us trace the events that led to the surrender and the handover of Thessaloniki to the Greeks.
Map of the Balkans at 1905
The first Balkan War started in early October 1912 as an armed conflict between Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria on one side and the Ottoman Empire on the other. Greece was the weakest of the three major Balkan allies, with a population of only 2.7 million and with fresh memories of the humiliating defeat in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897.
In spite of its apparent inferirority, the Greek Army started the war with a decisive victory in Sarantaporo, followed by another in the battle of Yannitsa. The liberation of Thessaloniki almost immediately after the battle of Yannitsa was the climax of Tahsin Pasha’s personal drama.
Note on the dates
Please note that some of the dates of the events mentioned below are based on the old calendar, as is for example the date of the liberation of Thessaloniki, 26th October 1912. In the modern calendar, the date is the 9th November. In any case, Whenever the date is based on the old calendar, I make a note.
The Battle of Sarantaporo
The Battle of Sarantaporo, variously also transliterated as ‘Sarantaporon or Sarandaporon (Greek: Μάχη του Σαρανταπόρου) took place on October 9-10 (old calendar), 1912. It was the first major battle fought between the Greek and Ottoman armies in the First Balkan War, and resulted in a Greek victory.
The battle was of major significance to the war. The Greek soldiers performed well, and the victory helped expunge the stain of the defeat in the war of 1897. Furthermore, the Sarantaporo passes were the only positions where the numerically inferior Ottoman forces had any hope of stopping the Greek Army. Field Marshal von der Goltz had confidently proclaimed that the passes would prove to be “the graveyard of the Greek Army”.
In his memoirs, General Hassan Tahsin Pasha, describes, in his own way, the conditions, which prevailed, and the outcome of the collapse of the front (3):
“The Chief of Staff, who returned, in the early hours of the morning, a human wreck, because of the fatigue and anguish felt by his soul, reported flatly to me that the last hope of maintaining the defence of the passage through the gates was lost because of the indescribable panic which had been caused and the uncontrollable flight of the reserves who had been saved from the bloody struggle at the fort of… I anticipated that it would be impossible to confront the enemy on a new line because of its overwhelming superiority both in quantity and quality, especially in its artillery, where the ratio was such that it brought with it apparent implications not only for this line itself but for the entire front in western and central Macedonia. It was, however, in the morale of the opposing forces where the difference was greatest”.
Field Marshal von der Goltz
After the battle of Sarantaporo, “The demoralized Ottomans retreated northward, abandoning stores and equipment. The Greeks pursued them leisurely. The exhaustion of their troops and the dificulties of transportation prevented them from chasing the enemy and delivering a decisive blow. They also lacked an effective appreciation of reconnaissance. One observer noted, ‘There is no such thing as a scout in the whole Greek army’. The same inability and disinclination to pursue the defeated enemy beset the Serbs after Kumanovo and the Bulgarians after Lozengrad.” (1)
Following the victory at Sarantaporo the first tension between Crown Prince Constantine and Venizelos surfaced, in a dispute over the army’s course . Constantine wanted to march due north, towards Monastir, while Venizelos was anxious that the army should turn east, towards the strategically important city and harbor of Thessaloniki. King George overruled his son’s insistence that the army pursue a military rather than a political agenda and Salonika became the chief objective of the Greek army. This development reinforced the divide between the Crown Prince and prime minister Venizelos, which would result in the former being ousted by the latter in 1917.
The battle of Yannitsa
“On 1 November, Ottoman positions at Yanitsa (Turkish, Yenije Vardar) held up the Greek advance. The two sides fought a bloody battle. The Ottomans, reinforced by troops from Bitola, resisted stoutly at first. On 2 November, the Greeks overran the Ottoman positions at a cost of 1,200 dead and wounded, with around 1,960 dead and wounded ottoman. They then turned to the east toward their goal. The Ottomans had destroyed the road bridge, but not the railway bridge over the Vardar River. Using the railway bridge, the Greeks continued their advance. The way to Salonika was now open.” (1)
The battle of Yannitsa freed the way for the liberation of Thessaloniki.
The defeated Turks rushed back on the road to Thessaloniki. Their morale destroyed, their ankles deep in mud. The military correspondent of the “Times”, Crawford Price wrote: “I have seen a lot of noteworthy things in Macedonia, but nothing as dramatic as the retreat of the defeated Tahsin Pasha’s troops the day after the battle of Yannitsa.”
The artillery commander Manouil Raktivan wrote to Penelope Delta “20th October – old calendar – in Yannitsa. It is the day we actually got Thessaloniki back.”(2)
The liberation of Thessaloniki by the Greek Army
Greek troops were closing in and Salonica was in great danger. As fighting was going on in Giannitsa, the ex-Sultan in exile, Abdülhamit II, was removed from Salonica back to Istanbul for his safety (see my article on Abdülhamit II). Meanwhile, the Greeks supported the Thessaly Army from the sea. Troops were landed on the shores east of Salonica on 5 November and on the same day a Greek destroyer sunk the Ottoman warship Feth-i Bülent, which was anchored at the port of Salonica.
The town was not only blockaded, but Greek warships, including Averof, were shelling the Turkish fortifications as well. (7)
The Governor of Salonica, Nazım Bey, asked Hasan Tahsin Paşa not to fight in the suburbs in order to protect the city and its inhabitants from harm. The Turkish commander was desperate. He had only 25,000 men, encircled by more than 100,000 Greeks and Bulgarians, and he was thinking that surrender would be a better idea than futile bloodshed. An armistice was agreed by between Hasan Tahsin Paşa and Crown Prince Constantine and on November 9, troops of the Thessaly Army occupied the city without facing resistance. One thousand Turkish officers, including Hasan Tahsin himself, and 25,000 men were taken prisoner and 70 artillery guns were confiscated. Two days later, the King of Greece, George I, entered Salonica amidst the cheers of the local Christian population. Meanwhile, the Struma Corps commanded by Ali Nadir Paşa, which was supposed to prevent the Serbian forces from reaching the Aegean shores, had surrendered as well. (7)
Greek troops entering Thessaloniki 1912
When pressed by the Bulgarians to come to terms with them, Tahsin Pasha replied “I have only one Thessaloniki, which I surrendered to the Greeks”. (1)
The British reporter, Crawford Price, conveys the image of the entrance of the Greek army to the readers of the Times (3):
«The first afternoon hours had already passed when a detachment of cavalry at the head of the Evzone battalion proceeded through the streets of Thessaloniki in this way offering an opportunity to the Greek population of the Macedonian capital to demonstrate their feelings. The flags with the Turkish crescent moon disappeared as if by magic and were replaced everywhere by blue and white Greek flags. Beautiful girls on their balconies were showering the victors with rose petals until every road was covered with a carpet of flowers and the crowd was cheering continuously. So great was the crowd which had gathered before the khaki-clad soldiers that it was only with difficulty that the soldiers were able to proceed even in simple lines.”
Richard Hall comments on the surrender of Tahsin Pasha: “The Ottomans sold Salonika cheaply. Although the Greek fleet cut off the city and any hopes of reinforcement by sea, the Ottomans still had significant forces in Macedonia at the time of surrender. They might have resisted for a while on the east bank of the Vardar River, which formed a significant natural obstacle. Unfortunately, they did not even destroy the railway bridge across the river. They also might have bought valuable time by extending the negotiations and exploiting the rivalry between the Bulgarians and the Greeks. These failures were the fault of the Ottoman command. Clearly Hassan Tahsin Pasha was not up to his responsibilities.” (1)
Kenan Messare: The surrender of Thessaloniki
Tahsin Pasha was Albanian, a son in the family of Messare. He studied at the Zossimaea School of Ioannina and married a Greek woman who had converted to Islam.
He served in the Ottoman Army for 40 years, and everywhere he left the impression of an able, modest and fair commander.
He met with Eleftherios Venizelos while he was stationed on the island of Crete.
Some observers alleged that he was in touch with Venizelos while preparing to surrender Thessaloniki.
No matter what his motives were, it is clear from the turn of events that Tahsin Pasha did not want to destroy the city, or subject it to the perils of war.
He also did not cherish the thought of the Bulgarians playing a role in the new regime of Thessaloniki.
After his captivity by the Greeks, Tahsin Pasha and his son and adjutant Kenan Messare were sent with the help of Venizelos to France and later to Lausanne, in Switzerland, where Tahsin Pasha perished in 1918.
Museum of Balkan Wars, Gefyra, near Thessaloniki
The mansion in Gefyra (Topsin)
Gefyra is a small town on the 25th kilometer of the road from Thessaloniki to Edessa, near the river Axios. Gefyra in Greek means bridge.
In the southeastern part of the town, called in Turkish “Topsin” (a place of artillery) is a mansion in the middle of the Modiano agricultural estate. The masion was built in 1906 on designs by archtect P. Arigoni, by Yakos Modiano, one of the three sons of Saul Modiano, the second richest owner of land in Ottoman Empire. In the high days of the estate you could see more than 1,000 workers in the farm and the estate.
In 1999 the mansion was bought by the Greek Army and became the Museum of Balkan Wars.
In the courtyard of the Museum the visitor will see a monument to Tahsin Pasha. The remains of Tahsin Pasha and his son and adjutant Kenan Messare have been placed inside the monument.
The Turks who visit the museum hear Tahsin Pasha’s name with a condescending nod. In the Turkish language even today they use the following expression when one answers how hard is to do something: “As hard as the capture of Salonica!”
Field Marshal von der Goltz
After defeat in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), Sultan Hamid, ruler of the Ottoman Empire, asked for German aid in reorganizing the Ottoman Army, so that they would be able to resist the advance of the Russian Empire. Baron von der Goltz was sent. He spent twelve years on this work which provided the material for several of his books. After some years he was given the title Pasha (a signal honor for a non-Muslim) and in 1895, just before he returned to Germany, he was named Mushir (field-marshal). His improvements to the Ottoman army were significant and the Turkish army stopped at the gates of Athens in the Greco-Turkish War (1897), only when the Czar Nicholas II of Russia threatened the Ottoman Sultan that he would be attacking the Ottoman Empire from eastern Anatolia, unless the Ottoman Army stopped the campaign.
On his return to Germany in 1896 Goltz became a lieutenant-general and commander of the 5th division, and in 1898, head of the Engineer and Pioneer Corps and inspector-general of fortifications. In 1900 he was made general of infantry and in 1902 commander of the I. army corps. In 1907 he was made inspector-general of the newly created sixth army inspection established at Berlin, and in 1908 was given the rank of colonel-general (Generaloberst). Following the 1911 manœuvres Goltz was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal), and retired from active service. In 1911 he founded the Jungdeutschlandbund (Young German League), an umbrella organization of right wing German youth associations.
Goltz died on 19 April 1916, in Baghdad, just two weeks before the British in Kut surrendered. The official reason for his death was typhus, although apparently there were rumors that he had been poisoned by the Turks. In accordance with his will, he was buried in the grounds of the German Consulate in Tarabya, Istanbul, overlooking the Bosporus.
