“Η Κύπρος αποτελεί το πρώτο βήμα προς το Αιγαίο” είχε δηλώσει στις αρχές του 1975 ο Τούρκος υπουργός Εξωτερικών Μελίχ Εσεμπέλ μέσα στην τουρκική Εθνοσυνέλευση.
Έχουν περάσει 45 χρόνια από τότε και η Τουρκία συνεχίζει την ίδια πολιτική, όπως μας δείχνει το πρόσφατο (31/1/2020) επεισόδιο με το ερευνητικό πλοίο «Oruc Reis».
Το «Oruc Reis» ανήκει στην Γενική Διεύθυνση Ορυκτών Ερευνών (MTA) της Τουρκίας, ένα ινστιτούτο του τουρκικού υπουργείου Ενέργειας και από το 2017 όταν και τέθηκε σε υπηρεσία «οργώνει» την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο για έρευνες, πολλές φορές κινούμενο προκλητικά και παράνομα εντός της κυπριακής ΑΟΖ. (Πηγή: Ναυτεμπορική, του Γιώργου Φωκιανού)
Στοιχεία του Ερευνητικού Πλοίου ORUC REIS
IMO: 9675470
Όνομα: ORUC REIS
Τύπος Σκάφους Γενικά Vessel Type – Generic: Dredger
Τύπος Σκάφους Ειδικά Vessel Type – Detailed: Research/Survey Vessel
Κατάσταση: Ενεργό
MMSI: 271044654
Διακριτικό (Call Sign): TCA4398
Σημαία: Turkey [TR]
Ολική Χωρητικότητα (GRT): 4789
Summer DWT: 2256 t
Ολικό Μήκος x Μέγιστο Πλάτος: 86 x 19 m
Έτος ναυπήγησης: 2017
Το πλοίο έχει κλείσει τον πομπό με τον οποίο ενημερώνεται ο διεθνής ιστότοπος θαλασσίων μεταφορών για τις θέσεις των πλεόντων πλοίων. Η τελευταία θέση ελήφθη: 2020-01-24 23:00 UTC
“Συναγερμός σήμανε το πρωί (Παρασκευή 31/1/2020) στο υπουργείο Εθνικής Άμυνας, όταν το τουρκικό ερευνητικό σκάφος «Oruc Reis» κινήθηκε εκτός δηλωθείσας περιοχής NAVTEX, με δυτικές πορείες και βρέθηκε στο νοτιοανατολικό άκρο της ελληνικής υφαλοκρηπίδας και μάλιστα ανήμερα της επετείου της κορύφωσης της κρίσης των Ιμίων.” (Πηγή: Ναυτεμπορική, του Γιώργου Φωκιανού)
Στον χάρτη του Νίκου Τριάντη φαίνεται με κόκκινο η δυτική πορεία του τουρκικού πλοίου από και η είσοδο του στα ελληνικά χωρικά ύδατα. Με κίτρινο σημειώνεται η νοτιοανατολική πορεία της ελληνικής φρεγάτας “Νικηφόρος Φωκάς” (F466) που “παρακολουθεί” (ή αναχαίτισε 😉 το τουρκικό ερευνητικό σκάφος.
Το Γενικό Επιτελείο Εθνικής Άμυνας (ΓΕΕΘΑ) ανέφερε τα εξής:
“Το ερευνητικό τουρκικό σκάφος «ORUC REIS» τις πρώτες πρωινές ώρες της 31 Ιανουαρίου 2020 κινήθηκε με δυτικές πορείες εκτός δηλωθείσας περιοχής NAVTEX και ευρίσκεται στο νοτιοανατολικό άκρο του ελληνικού FIR. Στην περιοχή επικρατούν δυσμενείς καιρικές συνθήκες, ενώ η εν λόγω κίνηση παρακολουθείται από μέσα και Μονάδες των Ε.Δ”. (Πηγή: news247.gr, 31/1/2020)
Ο Στέλιος Πέτσας, κυβερνητικός εκπρόσωπος, δήλωσε σχετικά.
«Αυτό που εμείς βλέπουμε με βάση την πληροφορία από τους ανθρώπους που πήγαν εκεί, από τη φρεγάτα που έφθασε στο σημείο με όλα τα μέσα που έχει ο Ελληνικός Στρατός να ελέγξει την περιοχή μας, είδαμε ότι πρόκειται για ένα ζήτημα που οφείλεται μάλλον στις καιρικές συνθήκες. Από κει και πέρα εμείς παρακολουθούμε ψύχραιμα όλες αυτές τις εξελίξεις και αυτό που πρέπει να ξέρουν οι Έλληνες είναι ότι η Ελλάδα είναι έτοιμη να προασπίσει τα κυριαρχικά της δικαιώματα αλλά θα πράξει αυτό που πρέπει με ψυχραιμία και αυτοπεποίθηση». Ερωτηθείς για το αν επρόκειτο για ένα είδος «τεστ» από την πλευρά της Τουρκίας, ο κ. Πέτσας σημείωσε ότι «δεν χρειάζεται κανείς να μας τεστάρει, είμαστε έτοιμοι». (Πηγή: tvxs.gr, 1/2/2020)
Σχολιάζοντας τα γεγονότα, ο Αντώνης Αντωνιάδης, πρώην Αρχηγός Γενικού Επιτελείου Ναυτικού δήλωσε.
«Αν απευθύνονται σε κρετίνους μπορείς να τους πεις, ότι ένα ωκεανογραφικό, εντεταλμένο να κάνει ωκεανογραφικές έρευνες, βρέθηκε στην υφαλοκρηπίδα λόγω καιρικών συνθηκών», ενώ συνέχισε λέγοντας «δεν κατάλαβα τι ρόλο παίζει ο καιρός, είχε μόνο 5 μποφόρ. Μόνο έναν ακυβέρνητο πλοίο μπορεί να παρασυρθεί σε χωρικά ύδατα από τον καιρό. Ένα πλοίο που έχει προπέλες και πηδάλιο δεν παρασύρεται».
Για την παρακολούθηση του Oruc Reis από την φρεγάτα Νικηφόρος Φωκάς ανέφερε: «το οποίο είναι καραγκιοζιλίκι τώρα». «Γιατί αυτό που μας κάνει το Ορούτς Ρέις, που παραβιάζει την υφαλοκρηπίδα για 24 ώρες, δηλαδή παραβιάζει τα κυριαρχικά μας δικαιώματα επί 24 ώρες και η Ελληνική πλευρά το μόνο που κάνει, στέλνει ένα πλοίο να παρακολουθεί την παραβίαση κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων. Τα κυριαρχικά σου δικαιώματα δεν τα προασπίζεις παρακολουθώντας την παραβίασή τους». (Πηγή: tvxs.gr, 1/2/2020)
Υπάρχει λοιπόν ένα θέμα ως προς την ελληνική στάση, που κατά μίαν άποψη ήταν υποχωρητική σε βαθμό που ενθαρρύνει την Τουρκία να επαναλάβει στο μέλλον παρόμοιες ενέργειες, ή και χειρότερες.
Και ενδοκυβερνητικά όμως φαίνεται να υπάρχει δυσαρμονία: “αποπειράθηκε η Τουρκία να ελέγξει τα αντανακλαστικά μας ή όχι;”.
Δύο μέρες μετά το επισόδιο, ο Νίκος Παναγιωτόπουλος, Υπουργός Εθνικής Αμύνης (ΥΕΘΑ), δήλωσε ότι: «από την πρώτη στιγμή η ελληνική πλευρά παρακολούθησε την πορεία του (Oruc Reis). Δέχομαι την ερμηνεία ότι κινήθηκε με αυτό τον τρόπο λόγω καιρού, γνωρίζω όμως πολύ καλά ότι ελέγχονται τα ανακλαστικά μας. Τα οποία και σε αυτή την περίπτωση λειτούργησαν με τον καλύτερο δυνατό τρόπο». (Πηγή: Militaire News, 3/2/2020).
Με την τοποθέτηση αυτή όμως διαφωνεί ο Υπουργός Εξωτερικών κ. Νίκος Δένδιας.
«Δεν υπήρξε επεισόδιο γύρω από τον πλου του συγκεκριμένου πλοίου», «δεν ήταν τεστ των δικών μας αντανακλαστικών», δήλωσε ο Νίκος Δένδιας στην Όλγα Τρέμη (στην ΕΡΤ). Αλλά δεν έμεινε μόνο εκεί. Άφησε αιχμές κατά του κ. Παναγιωτόπουλου και για την επικοινωνιακή διαχείριση του θέματος. «Άστο καλύτερα αυτό να πάει στην ευχή το θέμα με το Ουρούτς» είπε στην εκπομπή. «Επειδή θέλω να είμαι ειλικρινής, πιστεύω ότι δεν αριστεύσαμε στην επικοινωνία στο συγκεκριμένο θέμα». (Πηγή: the PRESSROOM, 7/2/2020).
Σε όλα αυτά έρχεται να προστεθεί από τον κ. Νίκος Παναγιωτόπουλο, Υπουργό Εθνικής Αμύνης (ΥΕΘΑ), και η “γραφική” περιγραφή της επικοινωνίας του με τον Πρωθυπουργό κ. Κυριάκο Μητσοτάκη.
Ο υπουργός Εθνικής Άμυνας, αποκάλυψε ακόμη ότι βρισκόταν από την πρώτη στιγμή που ενημερώθηκε η Ελλάδα για το περιστατικό με το τουρκικό ερευνητικό σκάφος σε ανοιχτή γραμμή με τον πρωθυπουργό, τον οποίο ενημέρωνε συνεχώς για τις κινήσεις και την πορεία του Ορούτς Ρέις. «Κύριε πρωθυπουργέ, είναι σε εκείνο το σημείο. Το παρακολουθούμε από απόσταση. Εντάξει κύριε υπουργέ, ψυχραιμία» ήταν ο πρώτο διάλογος που είχαν Παναγιωτόπουλος – Μητσοτάκης. Μετά από λίγες ώρες ακολούθησε νέα τηλεφωνική επικοινωνία. «Κύριε υπουργέ μετακινήθηκε; Άλλαξε λίγο πορεία αλλά δεν είμαστε σίγουροι ότι βγαίνει. Τι συνιστάτε κύριε υπουργέ; Ψυχραιμία κύριε πρωθυπουργέ. Ανταγωνισμός ψυχραιμίας, όπως σας το είπα» δήλωσε ο υπουργός Άμυνας. (Τα Νέα, 3/2/2020)
Το μόνο σίγουρο είναι ότι από ψυχραιμία πάμε καλά. Για όλα τα άλλα διατηρώ επιφυλάξεις. Ειδικά ως προς τη βαρύτητα της παραβίασης του χώρου εθνικής κυριαρχίας της Ελλάδος από το τουρκικό σκάφος.
Ο κ. Δένδιας σαφέστατα προσπάθησε να υποβαθμίσει το όλο γεγονός.
Όσον αφορά το περιστατικό με την είσοδο του τουρκικού ερευνητικού πλοίου «Oruc Reis» σε περιοχή άνωθεν ελληνικής υφαλοκρηπίδας ο κ. Δένδιας είπε στην ίδια συνέντευξη ότι «είναι καλό να κλείσουμε τη σελίδα αυτή». «Υπήρξε μια δυσαναλογία της ενασχόλησης της κοινής γνώμης με το συμβάν. Να μην δίνουμε στην άλλη πλευρά την εντύπωση ότι μπορεί κατά το δοκούν να ανεβάζει το θερμόμετρο. Χρειάζονται ψυχρές, μετρημένες αντιδράσεις ώστε να μην δίνουμε την εντύπωση ότι μπορεί να μας σύρει σε οτιδήποτε» πρόσθεσε. (Πηγή: ΕΘΝΟΣ 3/2/2020).
Χωρίς να θέλω να είμαι μάντης κακών, υπενθυμίζω ότι αρκεί ένα σοβαρό επεισόδιο για να αλλάξουν τα σύνορα, όπως έμαθε με ιδιαίτερα επώδυνο τρόπο η Κύπρος το 1974. Η μέχρι σήμερα εξέλιξη των γεγονότων δεν με πείθει για την επάρκεια της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής, και για το λόγο αυτό προτιμώ να ανησυχώ παρά να επαναπαύομαι. Εκτιμώ δε ιδιαίτερα την ποιότητα επικοινωνίας του κ, υπουργού ΥΠΕΘΑ, που τουλάχιστον πείθει για την ειλικρίνεια του. Οι Έλληνες και οι Ελληνίδες πρέπει να είναι ενημερωμένοι για τα όσα γίνονται.
Ιστορικοί όπως ο Στάθης Καλύβας (1) και ο Ανδρέας Γερολυμάτος θεωρούν ότι ο εμφύλιος πόλεμος άρχισε το 1943, η δε περίοδος 1943 – 1944 αναφέρεται ως «ο κατοχικός εμφύλιος». Το τέλος αυτής της περιόδου ορίζεται από τα Δεκεμβριανά του 1944.
Από τα τέλη Αυγούστου που έγινε γνωστή η επικείμενη αποχώρηση των Γερμανών από την Ελλάδα μέχρι τα τέλη Οκτωβρίου 1944 που αυτή ολοκληρώθηκε, η χώρα και η πρωτεύουσα Αθήνα βρέθηκαν σε μια μετέωρη κατάσταση, στην οποία διαδραματίστηκαν αιματηρές συγκρούσεις και πράξεις βίας ανάμεσα στις δυνάμεις του ΕΑΜ-ΕΛΑΣ-ΚΚΕ και τους αντικομουνιστές αντιπάλους τους , που πολλές φορές ήταν άμεσοι συνεργάτες των Γερμανών, όπως τα διαβόητα Τάγματα Ασφαλείας.
Το ιδιαίτερο χαρακτηριστικό αυτής της περιόδου είναι ότι καθώς ξεθωριάζει η κατοχική εξουσία και τα όργανα της, η διαμόρφωση της διάδοχης κατάστασης είναι αργή και βασανιστική, κι έτσι πρακτικά η Αθήνα είναι μια ακυβέρνητη πόλη. Ενώ τα περιστατικά βίας είναι πολλά, είναι αξιοσημείωτο το ότι δεν συνέβησαν πολύ περισσότερα, ούτε και έχουν χαρακτήρα στρατιωτικής επιχείρησης. Είναι πράξεις εκδίκησης και αντεκδίκησης. Αν δε λάβει κανείς υπόψη του ότι οι πρώτες Βρετανικές δυνάμεις μπήκαν στην πρωτεύουσα στις αρχές Οκτωβρίου 1944 (επιχείρηση «Μάννα»), μπορεί αβίαστα να καταλήξει στο συμπέρασμα ότι ο ΕΛΑΣ είτε δεν μπορούσε είτε δεν ήθελε να καταλάβει την πρωτεύουσα πριν εισέλθουν οι Άγγλοι. Αυτό όμως είναι θέμα για άλλο άρθρο.
Στο άρθρο αυτό ανθολογώ κάποιες από αυτές τις συγκρούσεις χρησιμοποιώντας τα ψηφιακά αρχεία της εφημερίδα ς «Ελευθερία», με την συνεπικουρία δύο διατριβών, της διπλωματικής του Ιάσωνα Χανδρινού (4) και της διδακτορικής του Μενέλαου Χαραλαμπίδη (6).
Οι Πρωταγωνιστές
Οι ομάδες, οργανώσεις και τα άτομα που αναφέρονται στην ενότητα αυτή μετέχουν άμεσα ή έμμεσα στα συμβάντα που περιλαμβάνονται σε αυτό το ανθολόγιο. Η αναφορά είναι πολύ συνοπτική, ώστε να μπορέσει η αναγνώστρια του άρθρου να το διαβάσει χωρίς να έχει την ανάγκη να συμβουλευθεί κάποια άλλη πηγή.
Τα Τάγματα Ασφαλείας ή Τάγματα Ευζώνων (κατά την επίσημη ονομασία τους) ή Γερμανοτσολιάδες (απαξιωτικός χαρακτηρισμός εξ αιτίας του δοσιλογισμού) ήταν παραστρατιωτικές ομάδες που έδρασαν στην Ελλάδα κατά το Β’ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, σε ρόλο υποστηρικτικό των Γερμανο-Ιταλο-Βουλγαρικών δυνάμεων κατοχής. Δημιουργήθηκαν από την κατοχική κυβέρνηση του Ιωάννη Ράλλη κατόπιν έγκρισης της Βέρμαχτ, με σκοπό τη διατήρηση της έννομης τάξης, κυρίως στην ύπαιθρο, πλήττοντας έτσι και την όποια αντίσταση προέβαλε ο ελληνικός λαός.(Βικιπαίδεια).
Ο συνταγματάρχης Ιωάννης Πλυτζανόπουλος ήταν μόνιμος αξιωματικός του ελληνικού στρατού, συνεργάτης των δυνάμεων κατοχής. Γεννήθηκε στον Πειραιά το 1888. Κατατάχθηκε εθελοντικά στον στρατό και μονιμοποιήθηκε ως αξιωματικός το 1916. Αποτάχθηκε δύο φορές, το 1919 για πολιτικούς λόγους και το 1932 για υπεξαίρεση δημοσίου χρήματος. Δεν έλαβε μέρος στον Ελληνοϊταλικό Πόλεμο. Αποκαταστάθηκε τον Νοέμβριο του 1943 με διάταγμα της δοσιλογικής κυβέρνησης Ιωάννη Ράλλη και τοποθετήθηκε διοικητής του 1ου Συντάγματος Ευζώνων Αθηνών (Τάγματα Ασφαλείας) με το βαθμό του συνταγματάρχη Πεζικού. Έλαβε μέρος σε όλες τις επιχειρήσεις αντιποίνων και εξάρθρωσης των δικτύων του ΕΑΜ-ΕΛΑΣ στις συνοικίες της Αθήνας (“μπλόκα”), σε συνεργασία με γερμανικές δυνάμεις. Αποτάχθηκε εκ νέου το 1945 και φυλακίστηκε ως δοσίλογος στις Φυλακές Καλλιθέας για σύντομο διάστημα. Πέθανε τη δεκαετία του ’50. (3)
Η Διεύθυνση Ειδικής Ασφαλείας του Κράτους (γνωστή και ως Ειδική Ασφάλεια ή απλά «Η Ειδική») ήταν ένα ειδικό τμήμα της Ελληνικής Χωροφυλακής που δημιουργήθηκε το 1929 για τη δίωξη των κομμουνιστικών οργανώσεων και τη σύλληψη των κομμουνιστών σε ολόκληρη την Ελλάδα. Στη διάρκεια της κατοχής συνεργάστηκε άμεσα με τις κατοχικές δυνάμεις και συμμετείχε σε μπλόκα που έγιναν σε διάφορες περιοχές της Αθήνας με εκατοντάδες θύματα καθώς και σε συλλήψεις, βασανιστήρια και εκτελέσεις μελών αντιστασιακών οργανώσεων. Επισήμως διαλύθηκε στις 28 Σεπτεμβρίου του 1944.(Βικιπαίδεια)
Η Οργάνωση «Χ» ήταν μια ακροδεξιά και φιλοβασιλική οργάνωση που ιδρύθηκε το 1941. Η ένθερμη υποστήριξή της προς το βασιλιά φαίνεται και από το ότι στο σήμα της υπάρχει το στέμμα. Αρχηγός της ήταν ο αξιωματικός Γεώργιος Γρίβας. Συχνά επέβαλε ένα καθεστώς τρομοκρατίας σε περιοχές της Αθήνας και της επαρχίας και δολοφονούσε μέλη και οπαδούς του ΚΚΕ και του ΕΑΜ – ΕΛΑΣ. Την περίοδο της κατοχής, η Χ είχε διατηρούσε αρκετά καλή σχέση με την (κατοχική) Ειδική Ασφάλεια και συνεργάστηκε αρμονικά μαζί της. Ο Ιάσονας Χανδρινός σε δημοσίευμά του στο περιοδικό «Ιστορικά Θέματα» (τεύχος 112, Μάρτιος 2012) σημειώνει ότι : « […] ήταν κοινό μυστικό στην κατεχόμενη Ελλάδα πως οι χίτες αποτελούσαν τους καλύτερους συμμάχους και πληροφοριοδότες των ταγματασφαλιτών, κατά τη διάρκεια των συγκρούσεών τους με τους ‘‘αντάρτες πόλης’’ του ΕΛΑΣ στις συνοικίες της Αθήνας. Κάνοντας ένα βήμα παραπάνω, πολλά μέλη της οργάνωσης θα εγγραφούν στην αναδιοργανωμένη, διαβόητη Διεύθυνση Ειδικής Ασφάλειας (τον κλάδο της Χωροφυλακής που ασχολείτο αποκλειστικά με τη δίωξη κομμουνιστών ήδη από το Μεσοπόλεμο) ως ‘’χωροφύλακες άνευ θητείας’’, συμμετέχοντας είτε ως πληροφοριοδότες είτε ως οπλίτες είτε ως εκτελεστές στο ανθρωποκυνηγητό που είχαν εξαπολύσει οι γερμανικές και ελληνικές αρχές κατοχής εναντίον των αντιστασιακών του ΕΑΜ στην Αθήνα και τον Πειραιά.» .
Η Οργάνωση Προστασίας Λαϊκών Αγωνιστών (ΟΠΛΑ) ήταν μια ένοπλη οργάνωση προσκείμενη στο ΚΚΕ, που άρχισε την δράση της στις αρχές του καλοκαιριού του 1943. Η ΟΠΛΑ επίσημα διαλύθηκε την άνοιξη του 1944, όταν το ΕΑΜ συγκρότησε την Πολιτική Επιτροπή Εθνικής Απελευθέρωσης (ΠΕΕΑ), και ενσωματώθηκε στον Εθνική Πολιτοφυλακή. Όμως η ονομασία ΟΠΛΑ συνέχισε να χρησιμοποιείται μέχρι την οριστική διάλυση της οργάνωσης το 1947, οπότε αντικαταστάθηκε από την Λαϊκή Πολιτοφυλακή.
Η χιτλερική ΟΕΔΕ (Οργάνωση Εθνικών Δυνάμεων Ελλάδος) ιδρύθηκε το 1942 και είχε αρχηγό τον Γεώργιο Παντέλογλου. που, ήταν και μέλος της οργάνωσης ΕΣΠΟ. Αυτός κατάφερε να αυξήσει τον αριθμό μελών της ΟΕΔΕ και η οργάνωση λειτούργησε μέχρι τη μέρα που οι Γερμανοί κατακτητές έφυγαν από την Ελλάδα.
Μετά τη συνθηκολόγηση της Ιταλίας το 1943 ο ΕΛΑΣ εξοπλίστικε με ιταλικό στρατιωτικό υλικό. Αντιδρώντας, η Ειδική Ασφάλεια εξόπλισε μέλη αντικομμουνιστικών οργανώσεων, συγκροτώντας ομάδες κρούσης. Η ομάδα Ιωάννη Σ. στη Ν. Ιωνία, του ανθυπομοίραρχου της Ειδικής Αντωνίου Παναγιωτόπουλου σε Σεπόλια – Κολωνό, της οικογένειας Πανολιάσκου στο Μεταξουργείο, της οικογένειας Παπαγεωργίου στο Παγκράτι, Αγήνορα στους Αμπελόκηπους, του ενωμοτάρχη της Ειδικής Ευάγγελου Χανιώτη στα Πατήσια, υπήρξαν μερικές από τις εστίες αναχαίτισης της συνεχώς διευρυνόμενης επιρροής του ΕΑΜ στην πόλη.(2)
Ανθολόγιο
Ο Νίκος Παπαγεωργίου, εύελπις και μέλος της Οργάνωσης Χ, είναι το πρώτο θύμα στο ανθολόγιο.
Εφονεύθη ο Παπαγεωργίου
«Προχθές Σάββατον ετραυματίσθη βαρύτατα πυροβοληθείς εξ εγγυτάτης αποστάσεως υπό τριών ατόμων ο γνωστός εύελπις Παπαγεωργίου. Ούτος μεταφερθείς εις το Νοσοκομείον του Μετοχικού Ταμείου Στρατού εξέπνευσεν τας πρωϊνάς ώρας της Κυριακής. Άνδρες της ομάδος του ως άνω Παπαγεωργίου ως αντίποινα δια τον φόνον του εξετέλεσαν χθες εις διάφορα σημεία του Παγκρατίου τρία άτομα. Επι των πτωμάτων των ανευρέθησαν πινακίδες με τις λεξειςς ‘Παπαγεωργίου 1’, ‘Παπαγεωργίου 2’, ‘Παπαγεωργίου 3’.
Ελευθερία,4/9/1944
Σύμφωνα με τον ιστορικό Μενέλαο Χαραλαμπίδη, η εκτέλεση του Παπαγεωργίου έγινε από την ΟΠΛΑ:
«Στις 2 Σεπτεμβρίου, η ΟΠΛΑ κατάφερε το μεγαλύτερό της πλήγμα στην ομάδα Παπαγεωργίου, τον ισχυρότερο εχθρό που αντιμετώπιζε το ΕΑΜικό κίνημα στις ανατολικές συνοικίες, εκτελώντας τον αρχηγό της» (5)
Όμως η ομάδα Παπαγεωργίου είχε προκαλέσει τόσα δεινά στα θύματα της στο Παγκράτι και τις γύρω περιοχές, που οι εκτελέσεις δεν σταμάτησαν εδώ. Ο ιστορικός Ιάσων Χανδρινός αναφέρει ότι σταδιακά μέχρι τον Δεκέμβριο 1944 εξοντώθηκε ολόκληρη η οικογένεια:
Γνωστότερη είναι η περίπτωση της οικογένειας του ευέλπιδος Νικόλαου Παπαγεωργίου, αρχηγού της Χ Παγκρατίου η οποία εξοντώθηκε ολοκληρωτικά. Εκτός από τον ίδιο (2.9.1944), εκτελέστηκαν ο αδελφός του Γιάννης (23.9.1944), η μητέρα του Βασιλική, οι αδελφές του Ελένη και Κατίνα κατά τη διάρκεια των Δεκεμβριανών (8.12.1944) και ο τρίτος αδελφός του Αλέκος μετά τον πόλεμο (12.12.1946) (Εφημερίς των Χιτών, φ. 2/3.6.1946 «Το ολοκαύτωμα της οικογένειας Παπαγεωργίου», φ.30/16.12.1946 «Οικογένεια Παπαγεωργίου. Ένας θρύλος και μια δόξα. Ένα τραγικό ολοκαύτωμα στην ιστορία της νεώτερης Ελλάδος»). (6)
Ο Παπαγεωργίου εκτελέστηκε την 2α Σεπτεμβρίου 1944. Την ίδια μέρα, η εξόριστη Κυβέρνηση του Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου στο Κάϊρο συμπληρώθηκε με εκπροσώπους της ΠΕΕΑ, του ΕΑΜ και του ΚΚΕ (Σβώλος, Ασκούτσης, Αγγελόπουλος) Πορφυρογένης, Ζεύγος και Τσιριμώκος).
Όμως οι κινήσεις στο επίπεδο της «υψηλής» πολιτικής δεν είχαν ιδιαίτερα μεγάλη επίπτωση στο πεδίο της μάχης των Αθηνών, που η εφημερίδα «Ελευθερία» χαρακτηρίζει «εμφύλιο πόλεμο» .
Ο Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος
«Χθες αι περιοχαί Βύρωνος, Παγκρατίου και Καισαριανής διήλθον πολλάς ώρας αγωνίας συνεπεία αθρόων πυροβολισμών οι οποίοι ερρίπτοντο υπό ανδρών της ομάδος του φονευθέντος ευέλπιδος Παπαγεωργίου, οι οποίοι ηπείλουν αντίποινα. Άνδρες της ομάδος τούτης εξετέλεσαν δύο πολίτας εις το μέρος όπου εφονεύθη ο αρχηγός τους . Συνεπεία των φόνων τούτων υπήρξαν συγκρούσεις, διαρκέσασαι επί ώρας χωρίς μέχρι στιγμής να γνωσθούν τ΄αποτελέσματα.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 5/9/1944
Τα αντίποινα ήταν «τυφλά». Για παράδειγμα, τι σχέση μπορεί να είχε ο 16χρονος Ι. Βαφειάδης που εκτελέστηκε από την ομάδα Παπαγεωργίου την 5η Σεπτεμβρίου 1944;
Το Αστυνομικόν 24ωρον
«Άτομα της ομάδος του φονευθέντος Παπαγεωργίου εξετέλεσαν εις το Παγκράτι τους Δ. Βαμβακόπουλον, των 22, Γεώργιον Κυριαζήν, ετών 49, Ι. Βαφειάδην, ετών 16, και έναν άγνωστον. Επί των θυμάτων τούτων ετέθησαν σημειώματα με τας φράσεις ‘Παπαγεωργίου 7,8,9’. Άλλα άτομα της ιδίας ως άνω ομάδος ετραυμάτισαν σοβαρώς τους Γ. Σκούρον και Δ. Μωραΐτην τους οποίους κατεβίβασαν εκ των κατευθυνομένων προς το Παγκράτι τραμ.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 6/9/1944
Οι συμπλοκές δεν έχουν τελειωμό.
Αδιάκοποι Συμπλοκαί και Πυροβολισμοί εις όλας τας Συνοικίας και το Κέντρον των Αθηνών
«Αι ενταθείσαι από ημερών συμπλοκαί εις τας Αθήνας , έφθασαν χθες εις το αποκορύφωμα των. Εις το Παγκράτι, το οποίον καθ΄ημέραν δοκιμάζεται από συρράξεις τοιούτου είδους, χθες διεξήχθη αληθινή μάχη αρχίσασα από τας οκτώ και μισή το πρωί, δια να συνεχισθεί μέχρι τας εσπέρας με μικράν μόνον διακοπήν την μεσημβρίαν. Κατ’ αυτήν εγένετο χρήσις όλμων, οπλοπολυβόλων, χειροβομβίδων και τυφεκίων, εξ όσων δε εγνώσθησαν, μεταξύ των θυμάτων καταλέγονται ενας χωροφύλαξ, ονόματι Καρύδης, ένας εύζωνας ονόματι Ραϊτης, και τρεις εκ των ανδρών της ομάδος Παπαγεωργίου, συμπραττούσης με τα όργανα ασφαλείας. Οι τρεις ούτοι ονομάζονται Σκλήρης, Κοπανίδης, και Παπαγεωγίου… Οι κάτοικοι του Παγκρατίου διήλθον ημέραν φοβεράς αγωνίας».
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 14/9/1944
Την 16η Σεπτεμβρίου το ΕΑΜ κήρυξε πανεργατική απεργία.
Τα αιματηρά γεγονότα του Σαββάτου (16/9/1944)
«… Τρίτη μεγάλη συμπλοκή εγένετο εις τας οδούς Υμητού – Κόνωνος, εκταθείσα εις τα υψώματα του Προφήτου Ηλίου και μέχρι Καισαριανής – Φορμίωνος – Ηλιάδος προς Γούβαν. Διήρκεσεν από της 4ης μ.μ. μέχρι σχεδόν της 7ης μ.μ. είχε δε ως αποτέλεσμα τον φόνον του συνταγματάρχου των ευζώνων Δασκαλάκη και 4 άλλων. Εις την συμπλοκήν αυτήν ετραυματίσθησαν εκ της ομάδος Παπαγεωργίου τρις καθώς και τινες πολίται. Άλλη συμπλοκή, κατά την οποίαν εφονεύθη και ο ομαδάρχης της Ειδικής Ασφάλειας Αν. Παναγιωτόπουλος (Κίσαβος) εγένετο εις την γέφυραν Κολοκυνθούς – Περιστερίου.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 18/9/1944
Μετά τα μεγάλης έκτασης επεισόδια που συνέβησαν κατά την απεργία της 16ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1944, επεκράτησε σχετική ηρεμία.
Το εσωτερικόν μέτωπον
«Εις τας Αθήνας και χθες επεκράτησεν ησυχία. Μια συμπλοκή μικράς διαρκείας εγένετο προ του κινηματογράφου Καπιτόλ εις την οδόν Αγίου Μελετίου κατ΄απόπειραν φόνου διοικητού ενός των ταγμάτων ασφαλείας. «
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 19/9/1944
Ο συνταγματάρχης Πλυτζανόπουλος αποτέλεσε στόχο πολλών επιθέσεων.
Το Αστυνομικόν 24ωρον
Εις την οδόν Αγίου Μελετίου άγνωστοι συνεπλάκησαν με τους φρουρούς της οικίας όπου διαμένει ο αρχηγός των ταγμάτων ασφαλείας συνταγματάρχης Πλυτζανόπουλος. Ερρίφθησαν εκατέρωθεν πολλοί πυροβολισμοί και χειροβομβίδες με αποτέλεσμα να προκληθεί αναστάτωσις εις ολόκληρον την περιοχήν. Εν τέλει οι ένοπλοι άγνωστοι απεχώρησαν.
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 20/9/1944
Ήτανε τόσο γνωστή η δράση του Πλυτζανόπουλου, που τον αναφέρει ονομαστικά και η μετριοπαθής εφημερίδα «Ελευθερία».
Όσοι παρακούσουν τας Κυβερνητικάς Διαταγάς θα τιμωρηθούν αμειλίκτως
Το ανωτέρω τηλεγράφημα (του Πρωθυπουργού Γ. Παπανδρέου προς την Επιτροπήν της Χίου) είναι ενδεικτικόν της στάσεως της Κυβερνήσεως έναντι των προσωρινών επιτροπών Διοικήσεως … Τα κύρια σημεία της Κυβερνητικής ανακοινώσεως έχουν ως εξής: Όσοι παρακούοντες τας διαταγάς της Κυβερνήσεως παραμένουν εις τα Τάγματα Ασφαλείας, θα υποστούν αμείλικτον τιμωρίαν δια την προδοσίαν των. Εις την ιδίαν κατηγορίαν υπάγονται και όλα τα άλλα ένοπλα σώματα τα οποία εκτελούν διαταγάς του εχθρού ή των πρακτόρων του, όπως οι άνδρες της ειδικής ασφαλείας και άλλων οργανώσεων συνεργαζομένων με αυτήν, συγκεκριμένως δε το ΕΕΕ, το ΕΑΣ εις Θεσσαλονίκην και παρόμοιαι οργανώσεις εις Μακεδονίαν. Ονομαστί η Εθνική Κυβέρνησις καταγγέλει τον αξιωματικόν Χωροφυλακής Λάμπου, τον ταγματάρχην πεζικού Πλυτζανόπουλον, τον συνταγματάρχην πεζικού Παπαδόγκωναν και τον εξωμότην ταγματάρχην Καπετσώνην.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 23/9/1944
Σειρά έχουν οι αδελφοί Πανολιάσκου, που όμως είναι τυχεροί και αποφεύγουν τα χειρότερα.
Το Αστυνομικόν 24ωρον
«Προχθές Κυριακήν, μεγάλη ομάς ατόμων, φερόντων αυτόματα και διάφορα άλλα όπλα, μετέβησαν εις την επί των οδών Μολιέρου και Αχχιλέως οικίαν των αδελφών Πανολιάσκου, ανηκόντων ως γνωστόν εις την Ασφάλειαν, και μη ευρόντες τούτους αφήρεσαν 24 οκάδες τρόφιμα τα οποία διεμοίρασαν εις του περίεργους και ένα ποδήλατον το οποίον παρέλαβον μεθ’ εαυτών.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 26/9/1944
Ο Ιάσων Χανδρινός αναφέρει τα ακόλουθα σχετικά με την «ομάδα Πανολιάσκου»:
«Αυτή την ομάδα που έχει κυριολεκτικά απαθανατιστεί στις εαμικές πηγές συγκροτούσαν τα πέντε παιδιά του Γιώργου Πανολιάσκου από τη Μάνδρα Αττικής, ιδιοκτήτη ταβέρνας και ξυλανθρακοπωλείου στη γωνία Θερμοπυλών και Μυλλέρου στο Μεταξουργείο, Κωνσταντίνος, Τίτος, Σωτήρης, Σπύρος και Αχιλλέας. Το κτίριο της ταβέρνας και του σπιτιού δεχόταν συχνά επιθέσεις με τουφέκια και χειροβομβίδες από ομάδες του ΕΛΑΣ (Μαγνητοφωνημένες συνεντεύξεις Βασίλη Σπανόπουλου, Θανάση Γιαννόπουλου, Γιώργου Τσαπόγα). Όταν ο μικρότερος από τους αδελφούς, ο Αχιλλέας που υπηρετούσε ως ένστολος χωροφύλακας στην Ειδική Ασφάλεια, εκτελέστηκε από την ΟΠΛΑ στην αγορά του Μεταξουργείου (25.1.1944), οι υπόλοιποι κατά πάσα πιθανότητα κατέφυγαν στα Τάγματα, καθώς τα ονόματά τους αναφέρονται σε μια ημερήσια διαταγή του 1ου Συντάγματος Ευζώνων ως υπηρετούντες αρχικά στο ΤΦΑΣ και μετά στο Σύνταγμα.» (6)
Ο αρχηγός της οργάνωσης ΟΕΔΕ Παντέλογλου προστίθεται στον κατάλογο των νεκρών την 26η Σεπτεμβρίου 1944. Σύμφωνα με τον ιστορικό Ιάσωνα Χανδρινό, ο Παντέλογλου δολοφονήθηκε από την ΟΠΛΑ.
Το Αστυνομικόν 24ωρον
«Άλλοι άγνωστοι εφόνευσαν εις το Μουσείον τον Παντέλογλου αρχηγόν τηε οργανώσεως ΟΕΔΕ.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 27/9/1944
Στο φύλλο της ίδιας ημέρας, 27ης Σεπτεμβρίου, η εφημερίδα Ελευθερία γράφει:
«Συμπλοκή μεταξύ ομάδων του ΕΑΜ και της Οργανώσεως Χ εγένετο εις την διασταύρωσιν των οδών Πειραιώς – Αγ. Ασωμάτων μετά το τέλος της οποίας ευρέθησαν εκεί τα πτώματα των Χ. Φωτεινού και Π. Λιάπη. Πολλοί τραυματίαι κατόρθωσαν ν’ αποχωρήσουν.»
Παρόλον ότι στην Αθήνα ακόμη υπάρχουν Γερμανικά στρατεύματα, η εξόριστη Κυβέρνηση και το Συμμαχικό Στρατηγείο έχουν ορίσει Στρατιωτικό Διοικητή Αθηνών τον Στρατηγό Σπηλιωτόπουλο, όπως αναφέρει ο Πρωθυπουργός της Εξόριστης Κυβέρνησης Γεώργιος Παπανδρέου σε διάγγελμα του από την Καζέρτα της Ιταλίας, την 28η Σεπτεμβρίου 1944, αναφέρει:
«…Στρατιωτικός Διοικητής Αττικής έχει ορισθή από την ελληνικήν κυβέρνησιν και το Συμμαχικόν Στρατηγείον ο Στρατηγός Σπηλιωτόπουλος και τον διορισμόν τούτον ανεγνώρισαν ομοφώνως οι Στρατηγοί Σαράφης και Ζέρβας. Το λαϊκόν απελευθερωτικόν μέτωπον εις την πρωτεύουσαν οφείλει να τεθή υπό τας διαταγάς του.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 30/9/1944
Δεν είναι σαφές βέβαια το πως, με ποιες δυνάμεις ασκεί τα καθήκοντα του ο νέος Διοικητής, τη στιγμή που οι Γερμανοί είναι ακόμη στην Αθήνα. Αυτό όμως το αφήνω για ένα επόμενο άρθρο.
Η εφημερίδα «Ελευθερία» διερωτάται αν υπάρχουν περιθώρια αισιοδοξίας στην Αθήνα που περιμένει την απελευθέρωση της.
Να Αισιοδοξούμεν;
«Είναι ίσως παράδοξον, αλλά είναι αληθές. Και προπάντων είναι ευχάριστον: τα τελευταία εικοσιτετράωρα των Αθηνών, τουλάχιστον έως προχθές, υπήρξαν σχετικώς ήσυχα. Πυροβολισμοί ελάχιστοι ακούονται, και η ημεησία συγκομιδή πτωμάτων παρουσιάζεται κάπως ηλαττωμένη.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 9/10/1944
Τα γεγονότα της επόμενης ημέρας δίνουν αρνητική απάντηση στο ερώτημα της εφημερίδας.
Το Αστυνομικόν 24ωρον
«Η μεγαλυτέρα και πλέον αιματηρά εκ των χθεσινών συγκρούσεων υπήρξεν η της περιοχής του Θησείου – Αστεροσκοπείου – Πετραλώνων, η οποία ήρχισε χθες την πρωίαν και συνεχίσθη μέχρι της εσπέρας. Κατ’ αυτήν εγένετο χρήσις όπλων, αυτομάτων, χειροβομβίδων, πολυβόλων, έλαβον δε μέρος και Γερμανοί. Κατά τας υπάρχουσας πληροφορίας υπάρχουν πολλά θύματα. Προ της συμπλοκής αυτής είχε προηγηθεί άλλη εις τα Πετράλωνα, μεταξύ ομάδος του ΕΑΜ και ανδρών της ομάδος Παπαγεωργίου. Εις την συμπλοκήν αυτήν ετραυματίσθησαν 5.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 10/10/1944
Οι συμπλοκές και τα επεισόδια συνεχίζονται.
Το Αστυνομικόν 24ωρον
«Υπό ενόπλων απήχθησαν οι εν πολιτική περιβολή εύζωνες Π. Κλήμης και Ν. Λιούτρης , της φρουράς της οικίας του λοχαγού των Ταγμάτων Ασφαλείας Παπαγιαννοπούλου.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 11/10/1944
Νέαι Συμπλοκαί
«Ενώ η προχθεσινή ημέρα διήλθε σχετικώς ήρεμος, κατά το χθεσινόν απόγευμα εσημειώθησαν νέαι συγκρούσεις. Η μεγαλυτέρας εκτάσεως και διαρκείας υπήρξεν η σύγκρουσις μεταξύ Ταγμάτων Ασφαλείας και ΕΛΑΣ εις την οδόν Αχαρνών και Αγίου Μελετίου, όπου η οικία Πλυτζανοπούλου. Η μάχη αρξαμένη περί την 12.30΄ διήρκεσε μέχρι των απογευματινών ωρών. Μάχη επίσης έγινε και παρά το Ζάππειον μεταξύ τμημάτων του ΕΛΑΣ και Ταγμάτων.
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 12/10/1944
Η Αθήνα απελευθερώθηκε την 12η Οκτωβρίου 1944.
Ο Πρωθυπουργός Γεώργιος Παπανδρέου επέστρεψε στην Αθήνα την 18η Οκτωβρίου 1944.
Η Πολιτοφυλακή.
«Εις την διεύθυνσιν της αστυνομίας εκοινοποιήθη διαταγή του Στρατιωτικού Διοικητού καθιστώσα γνωστόν ότι η φερομένη ως «εθνική πολιτοφυλακή» δεν είναι δημοσία αρχή και συνεπώς αι υπό των οργάνων της συλλήψεις είναι παράνομαι.»
Εφημερίς Ελευθερία, 21/10/1944
Η ανωτέρω αναφορά αφορά την ΟΠΛΑ, που συνεχίζει την δράση της και μετά την συγκρότηση νέας Εθνικής Κυβέρνησης..
Επίλογος
Η περίοδος Σεπτεμβρίου – Οκτωβρίου 1944 είναι ιδιαίτερη, επειδή στη διάρκεια της οι Γερμανικές δυνάμεις κατοχής είχαν περιορίσει την παρουσία τους και υπήρχε στην ατμόσφαιρα η αναμονή για τη νέα κατάσταση, που θα προέκυπτε μετά την απελευθέρωση. Οι συνεχείς συγκρούσεις και η βία στους δρόμους της Αθήνας σηματοδοτούσαν την διάθεση των αντιμαχομένων πλευρών να τακτοποιηθούν οι απλήρωτοι λογαριασμοί. Ενώ όμως οι συνεργάτες των Γερμανών και οι αντικομμουνιστικές οργανώσεις προσέβλεπαν στην επιβίωση και τον μετασχηματισμό τους σε «εθνικές» δυνάμεις, οι περί το ΕΑΜ, ΕΛΑΣ, και οι κομμουνιστές κατέβαιναν στο πεδίο της μάχης χωρίς πρόγραμμα, ή ακόμη χειρότερα, αγνοώντας, παραβλέποντας το πρόγραμμα της άλλης πλευράς. Τεράστιο λάθος, που πληρώθηκε πολύ ακριβά.
Παραπομπές
Στάθης Καλύβας (2015), Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος (1943-1949): Το τέλος των μύθων και η στροφή προς το μαζικό επίπεδο. Επιστήμη και Κοινωνία: Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής και Ηθικής Θεωρίας, 11, 37-70.
Αλφαβητικός Θησαυρός, Memories of the Occupation of Greece, 2018)
Ιάσων Χανδρινός , «ΤΟ ΤΙΜΩΡΟ ΧΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΛΑΟΥ» Η δράση του ΕΛΑΣ και της ΟΠΛΑ στην κατεχόμενη Αθήνα (1942-1944). Διπλωματική Εργασία ΕΘΝΙΚΟ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΠΟΔΙΣΤΡΙΑΚΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΚΗ ΣΧΟΛΗ ΤΜΗΜΑ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ. Αθήνα 2009.
Μενέλαος Χαραλαμπίδης, Πτυχές της εμφύλιας σύγκρουσης στην κατοχική Αθήνα. Στην έκδοση Αφηγήσεις για τη δεκαετία του 1940, Επίκεντρο, Θεσσαλονίκη 2012.
Μενέλαος Χαραλαμπίδης, Η ΕΜΠΕΙΡΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΤΟΧΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΤΙΣΤΑΣΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΘΗΝΑ. ΤΟ ΕΑΜΙΚΟ ΑΝΤΙΣΤΑΣΙΑΚΟ ΚΙΝΗΜΑ ΣΤΙΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΙΚΕΣ ΣΥΝΟΙΚΙΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΘΗΝΑΣ: ΚΑΙΣΑΡΙΑΝΗ, ΒΥΡΩΝΑΣ, ΠΑΓΚΡΑΤΙ, ΓΟΥΒΑ, ΥΜΗΤΤΟΣ, Διδακτορική Διατριβή, ΕΘΝΙΚΟ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΠΟΔΙΣΤΡΙΑΚΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΚΗ ΣΧΟΛΗ ΤΜΗΜΑ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ. Αθήνα 2011.
“…στις ανθρώπινες σχέσεις, τα νομικά επιχειρήματα έχουν αξία όταν εκείνοι που τα επικαλούνται είναι περίπου ισόπαλοι σε δύναμη και ότι, αντίθετα, ο ισχυρός επιβάλλει ό,τι του επιτρέπει η δύναμή του και ο αδύναμος υποχωρεί όσο του το επιβάλλει η αδυναμία του.”
(διάλογος των Μηλίων στο 5ο βιβλίο του Θουκυδίδη, μετάφραση Α. Βλάχος)
Κάθε φορά που παρατηρείται ένταση στις σχέσεις Ελλάδος – Τουρκίας και ακούω τις δηλώσεις για το διεθνές δίκαιο, το σεβασμό του, και τα σχετικά, θυμάμαι αυτό το απόσπασμα από την Ιστορία του Θουκυδίδη.
Δεν χρειάζεται να αναφερθώ στο αυτονόητο των δηλώσεων αυτών, όσο και στο τετριμμένο τους. Ουσιαστικά δεν λένε τίποτε, ίσως αποτελούν μια “κονσέρβα” στα ράφια του Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών, που έχει μεγάλη διάρκεια ζωής.
Επί της ουσίας όμως. το έμμεσο ερώτημα που θέτει ο Θουκυδίδης παραμένει αναπάντητο: “είναι η Ελλάδα σήμερα περίπου ισόπαλη σε δύναμη με την Τουρκία;”
Πλησιάζουν οι εκλογές της 7ης Ιουλίου και όπως δείχνουν τα μέχρι τώρα δεδομένα, η χώρα θα έχει μια νέα κυβέρνηση, με επικεφαλής τον Κυριάκο Μητσοτάκη.
Η νέα αυτή Κυβέρνηση θα πρέπει να απαντήσει το ερώτημα αυτό και να λάβει μέτρα για φθάσουμε και να μπορούμε να διατηρήσουμε την “ισοπαλία” του Θουκυδίδη.
Ο κ. Τσίπρας είχε μια μεγάλη ευκαιρία να γίνει σημαντική πρόοδος στον τομέα αυτό με το θέμα της “Βόρειας Μακεδονίας”. Όμως δεν φαίνεται ότι διαπραγματεύθηκε προς την κατεύθυνση αυτή. Έτσι η συμφωνία των Πρεσπών δεν αποτέλεσε μοχλό για την ενίσχυση της Ελλάδας στον αμυντικό τομέα, όπως κατά την γνώμη μου θα έπρεπε.
Η εξωτερική πολιτική μιας χώρας πρέπει να προασπίζει τα συμφέροντα της. Από μόνη της όμως, δεν αρκεί. Χωρίς τις Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις η εξωτερική πολιτική είναι ανίσχυρη.
Προσδοκώ λοιπόν να ακούσω μετά τις εκλογές το πρόγραμμα για την ριζική ενίσχυση των Ελληνικών Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων, ώστε η “ισοπαλία” του Θουκυδίδη να μην είναι απλά μια αφηρημένη στόχευση, αλλά μια ρεαλιστική επιδίωξη.
Καθώς κλείνω αυτό το σημείωμα σκέφτομαι την Κύπρο το καλοκαίρι του 1974. Και την Κύπρο όπως είναι σήμερα. Και ο νοών νοήτω.
August Macke was born in 1887 and died in September 1914 in the trenches of Champagne, at the age of 27.
Macke was one of the expressionist painters who formed the Blue Rider (Blaue Rieter) group of painters at the beginning of the 20th century.
He was married to Elisabeth Gerhardt and had two sons.
In August 1912, Macke took part in a military exercise for the reserves in Elsenborn (today in Belgium). He wrote to his mother in Kandern (a town in Black Forest):
“[…] I have arrived here very well. I like it a lot, against expectation. The landscape is as beautiful as up on the Feldberg(a). There is wonderful honey. So everything is great […]”. “[…] For eight days we have now been going around in the rain with God for the King and the country. Liters of water in the boots. But I am standing up. Not even a cold. […]”. (1)
(a) Feldberg is a mountain in the Black Forest area in southwestern Germany. The village of Feldberg is located at 1,277 meters above sea, some 30 kilometers east of Kandern.
Macke was drafted shortly after his return form Tunisia, where he spent a month (April 1914) traveling with his fellow painter Paul Klee. He was 27 years old.
The trip to Tunisia was the high point of Macke’s artistic life. He arrived in Tunis on the 7th April 1914, on board the steamship “Carthage”. When he returned home he had 33 aquarelles, 79 drawings and many photographs in his bags.
“Wir liegen in der Sonne, essen Spargel. Dabei kann man sich umdrehen und hat Tausende von Motiven. Ich habe heute schon sicher 50 Skizzen gemacht. Gestern 25. Es geht wie der Teufel und ich bin in einer Arbeitsfreude, wie ich sie nie gekannt habe. Die afrikanische Landschaft ist noch viel schöner als die Provence!” (3)
“We lie in the sun eating apsaragus. There one can turn around and find thousands of themes. Today I have already prepared 50 sketches. Yesterday I did 25. It is as if I am in an artistic competition with the Devil, one which I cannot win. The African landscape is much pretier than Provence!” (the translation from German to English is mine).
After he was drafted and sent to the front, in his letters and postcards to Elisabeth, Macke uses words like “dreadful”, “horrible”, “awful”, “terrible” and “the most gruesome experience a man can undergo”. He suspects that his chances of surviving are minimal:
“I would consider myself incredibly lucky if I was to return from this war. I think about all the beautiful things that I have witnessed and that I have you to thank for”. Apart from being horrified about the losses on the German side, he also shows compassion considering the injured or killed French soldiers. (1)
On September 20 he is rewarded the Iron Cross Second Class, which he sends home immediately. His last postcard dates from September 24; in it, he asks for chocolate, warm socks, clothes, and cigarettes. On Saturday, September 26, German troops attacked French positions south of Perthes-lès-Hurlus. On this occasion, August Macke was killed. – In one of his last testimonies, Macke tells his brother in law about the front: “[…] My dearest ones! Safe and sound, I am back from a heavy battle. Yesterday, I got the Iron Cross and I am very happy about it. Auguste has written several times sending cigarettes. I am well and I think about you a lot. Faithfully goodbye, August […]”. (1)
August Macke, Turkish Coffee Shop, 1914
In a note from the front (1914) Macke wrote to his wife Elisabeth.
„Ich habe in den letzten Tagen viel an Dich, liebes Kind, gedacht, an die beiden, kleinen Kerle. Ich sehe immer das liebe, blonde Köpfchen vom Wölfchen und die großen träumenden Augen von Walter vor mir. Könnte ich die beiden sehen! Ich betrachte das jetzt immer als ein Wunder, daß das meine Jungen sind. … Ich wäre glücklich, wenn ich heimkommen könnte, in Eure Arme, wenn ich wieder malen könnte (das ist mir wie ein Traum jetzt). Aber wenn ich an die Kinder denke, dann packt mich immer eine wilde Verzweiflung, daß ich die nicht wiedersehen sollte. Es ist ja nur Egoismus, wenn ich einen Schmerz empfinde darüber, daß mir der Anblick der Kinder entrissen werden könnte. Kind, was werden wir aber glücklich sein, wenn dieser Krieg vorüber ist und wir sind wieder zusammen …“ (2)
In the last days I have thought a lot about you dear child, about the two little guys. I always have Wölfchen’s beloved blond head and Walter’s big dreamy eyes in front of me. I wish I could see them both! I always consider it a miracle that my children….I would be lucky to come home, in your arms, to be able to paint again (which is like a dream now). But when I think of the kids, a wild despair grabs me, that I will never see them again. When I feel pain about this, I seek a sight of the children to make the pain go away. Child, how lucky we would be, when this war is over and we are together again…” (the translation from German to English is mine).
Macke’s last painting is titled “Farewell”. In contrast with his other paintings that are bright and colorfull, this is a sombre, rather muted painting. As if the painter had a premonition about his imminent death.
The military dogma of the USA that Turkey is a strategic ally must change. It has outgrown its utility and is now becoming a liability.
The only reason that might preserve the dogma is military expenditure. But this is not a good enough reason in today’s world.
With Putin strongly in charge of a Russia that is never going to settle for less than equal when it comes to world power, the USA must now admit that their foreign and military policies have grown out of date.
Turkey can never play the role of a buffer between Russia and the Middle East. It has become the opposite. Russia is the main factor of instability as they fuel the conflict in the Middle East and use it to increase their sphere of influence.
This is the strategic game that the USA lost so far.
Putin embraced the Syrian regime and gave them the assurance they needed in order to survive ISIS and the other rebel forces.
Now Putin is there to stay and create more problems for the rather rigid and unsuspecting USA.
It is not an accident that Turkey is becoming best friends with Iran and that rumours of the development of Turkey’s nuclear capability are in the air.
Wake up USA before it is too late for you and the rest of the western world!
Two Greek military officers have been arrested on the 1st of March allegedly because they entered Turkish territory without permission.
The two officers were patrolling an area they knew very well, but the weather conditions were bad, and visibility was low.
As I write this, the officers remain in custody in Edirne, in a high security facility, while the Turkish judicial system is dealing with the case.
People who know the area claim that incidents like this were quite frequent in the past and were handled swiftly and informally by both sides, without placing personnel in custody.
The Greek Government appeared to be quite relaxed at the beginning, expressing optimism that the case will be settled wuickly and the officers will return to Greece. They were so relaxed that the press announcement made by the Army’s General Command was rather slopy, indirectly accepting the characterization of the incident by the Turkish side as “entry into Turkish territory”, even though they had no way of knowing this at the time.
As the days go by, the situation is turning into something more serious, and the Greek Government is now raising the issue with international organizations like NATO. The otimism of the first days has deflated and given its position to anxiety and concern.
Serious questions are asked regarding the unfolding of the incident, as it is claimed that the officers were on Greek territory and they were ambushed by the Turkish “Gendarma”. The Greeks resisted arrest and sustained injuries. This is the reason, according to some sources, that in the photographs released by the Turks following the incident the Greek officers’ faces are covered by hoods.
Why is Turkey acting like this? There is a simple explanation that relates this event to a 15th July 2016 event that is very high on Ankara’s agenda.
Not only the eight officers were not returned to Turkey, but during President Erdogan’s visit to Athens in December 2017, he was told by the Greek Prime Minister Tsipras that the Greek Judicial System is independent of the Executive, the Government, therefore this is not an issue he can deal with. It is outside his realm of powers.
To make things worse, President Erdogan has claimed while in Athens that Prime Minister Tsipras had promised him that the eight Turkish officers would be returned to Turkey. Therefore, he implied that Mr. Tsipras is not a man who keeps his word.
What we see developing now in the incident with the two Greek officers, is a mirror image of the eight Turkish officers’ incident, as far as its treatment by the Turkish Government is concerned.
The Turkish side repeatedly states that the matter will be decided by the court in Edirne, and the Turkish Army and Government have nothing to do with it.
If this is the case, Turkey is following a “tit for tat” strategy.
Tit for tat means “the infliction of an injury or insult in return for one that one has suffered.”
This is bad news for the Greek officers, because their case might drag on for a long time. It is also bad news for the Greek Government, who appear to be consistently missing the mark when it comes to dealing with Turkey.
The traditional conciliatory low-key approach that Greece has followed in its Turkish relationships, no longer works because Turkey has switched to an open conflict strategy.
Solutions ot this type of problems do not grow on trees, and I could not possibly claim to have one.
However, there is an old saying that “the solution of a problem begins with its recognition”.
Turkey is not playing stupid games. Turkey is a very serious country and Mr. Erdogan a capable and strong leader. The Greek Government must consider all incidents, including this one in Evros within a framework of ongoing open conflict, not a framework of good relations gone bad.
There lies the recognition of the problem.
Greece is conflicted with Turkey in a very serious way and the strategic analysis of this situation is far more complicated than the recognition of “tit for tat” in the Evros incident. As one might expect the necessary actions are even more serious and complicated, but Greece does not have a choice.
Conciliation leads to defeat and humiliation. The Greek people expect their government to do much better than that.
In the context of an online course I am taking, I recently read von Clausewitz’s “On War” and from the discussion that followed, realized that there was significant confusion on the meaning of the term “absolute” war, and its relation to “total” war. So I wrote an answer to a question in the discussion forum of the course and here I present an enhanced version.
The question of war is pertinent more than ever today, with the Western World facing its biggest challenge since World War II. In parallel to the activities in the theater of war in Syria, we now see terrorist activities developing at a massive scale in the heart of Europe.
Absolute War
If we agree that “absolute” war is a concept coined by Clausewitz, then we should try to understand what Clausewitz meant by “absolute” war. I will quote some passages from Book I, and then comment. All references are from von Clausewitz’s “On War”.
“We see, therefore, how, from the commencement, the absolute, the mathematical as it is called, nowhere finds any sure basis in the calculations in the Art of War; and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web, and makes War of all branches of human activity the most like a gambling game.”(Book I, 21)
It is interesting to note that in the above passage of Clausewitz the absolute is equated with the mathematical. The lack of it leads to lack of a sure basis. He seems to be saying that War is not a deterministic phenomenon, and that there are many factors that mat make it like a gambling game.
“Theory must also take into account the human element; it must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness. The Art of War has to deal with living and with moral forces, the consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive.”(Book I, 22)
“The War of a community—of whole Nations, and particularly of civilised Nations—always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is, therefore, a political act. Now if it was a perfect, unrestrained, and absolute expression of force, as we had to deduct it from its mere conception, then the moment it is called forth by policy it would step into the place of policy, and as something quite independent of it would set it aside, and only follow its own laws, just as a mine at the moment of explosion cannot be guided into any other direction than that which has been given to it by preparatory arrangements….But it is not so, and the idea is radically false.” (Book I, 23)
I believe that the highlighted passage (in bold) gives the answer to the question. “Absolute” war is a theoretical construct that never materializes, simply because the human and social actors engaged in war are far too complex. Absolute war is like the explosion of a mine, subject ONLY to the laws of physics. But even at the height of military operations, there are so many other factors partaking in the process, that the last thing one can speak of is “absolute”.
So, to wrap up, Clausewitz used the term “absolute” to denote a notion of war that can never materialize in human communities and with human actors.
Total War
“Total war” is a term that was comprehensively used in a series of articles published by Leon Daudet in 1918 (Daniel Marc Segesser, Controversy: Total War). Leon Daudet was a French journalist and writer.
[Total war] is the extension of the struggle in its pronounced as well as its chronic phases to the fields of politics, economics, trade, industry, intellectual abilities, jurisprudence and the financial world. Not only armies fight in battle, but also traditions, institutions, customs, codes, minds and most of all banks.[17]
Segesser concludes that
“The concept of “total war” was thus born out of the conviction that a radicalization of warfare as well as a comprehensive mobilization of human and material resources was necessary at a time when France was on the defensive in Verdun in 1916 and after the unsuccessful Nivelle offensive in 1917 when it tried to hold its ground.[19]“
After Daudet, the term was used by the German General Erich Ludendorff in his book Der Totale Krieg (The Total War) published in 1935. In it he promotes the idea that war should mobilize all the resources of the Nation, and thus be a Total War.
“Total war requires enormous things from the commander. Effort and labour will be expected from him that have never been asked for from commanders in the past, not even from Frederic the Great.[27]“
Building on the work of Ludendorff, Joseph Goebels delivered his 1943 speech a storming call to engage in “Total War”. Here are some excerpts.
“Total war is the demand of the hour… We can no longer make only partial and careless use of the war potential at home and in the significant parts of Europe that we control. We must use our full resources, as quickly and thoroughly as it is organizationally and practically possible. …The total war effort has become a matter of the entire German people. No one has any excuse for ignoring its demands. A storm of applause greeted my call on 30 January for total war. I can therefore assure you that the leadership’s measures are in full agreement with the desires of the German people at home and at the front. The people are willing to bear any burden, even the heaviest, to make any sacrifice, if it leads to the great goal of victory.” (Nation, Rise Up, and Let the Storm Break Loose, by Joseph Goebbels).
Goebels continues to describe the total war measures taken, like the drafting of all capable men (factory workers were exempt), the mobilization of women in civic duties, and so on.
When Goebels made his speech, the situation in Hitler’s Germany was critical. The battle of Stalingrad was lost and Germany was for the first time facing defeat. No wonder that Goebels calls all Germans to full mobilization.
From the brief references above, one can conclude that “total” war as defined by Daudet, Ludendorff and Goebels was the last resort to a war machine that had run into trouble and needed (or so some people had thought) to command all the resources, material and human, of society at large.
The term “total” war has also been used loosely by journalists and historians to characterize World War I, due to the technological advances in the means of warfare. However, this use is rather informal and lacks any real significance.
Conclusion
“Absolute” war is the functioning of the military machine as if it were lacking all human elements. It is therefore an abstraction that never materializes.
“Total” war is one where the military machine mobilizes all human and material resources of society.
The mountains look on Marathon,
And Marathon looks on the sea.
And musing there an hour alone,
I dreamed that Greece might still be free,
For standing on the Persian’s grave,
I could not deem myself a slave. (Lord Byron, The Isles of Greece)
In his 1846 review of Grote’s “History of Greece”, John Stuart Mill wrote:
“The interest of Grecian history is unexhausted and inexhaustible. As a mere story, hardly any other portion of authentic history can compete with it. Its characters, its situations, the very march of its incidents, are epic. It is an heroic poem, of which the personages are peoples. It is also, of all histories of which we know so much, the most abounding in consequences to us who now live. The true ancestors of the European nations (it has been well said) are not those from whose blood they are sprung, but those from whom they derive the richest portion of their inheritance. The battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the battle of Hastings. If the issue of that day had been different, the Britons and the Saxons might still have been wandering in the woods.”
Introduction
The Battle of Marathon is important for many reasons. Lord Byron and John Stuart Mill stated some of the them in the passages quated above.
It also has many layers.
The military layer is one of them.
The other is Persians against Greeks.
There is also one though that is not apparent at first sight. Democracy against oligarchy and aristocracy.
Democracy in Athens
One clarification is required at the outset. The Athenian Polis included all of Attica, not only the geographic area of Athens.
Marathon is one of the areas of Attica, and thus was part of the Athenian Polis.
Most historians agree that Democracy in Athens was established by Cleisthenes in 508/507.
In 510 BC, with the help of the Spartans, Cleisthenes overthrew Hippias, the ruler of Athens, son of tyrant Peisistratos, who ruled the City until 528 BC.
But he did not rule straight away, because the Spartans favoured his rival, Isagoras, and they expelled Cleisthenes from the city.
After returning to power, Cleisthenes made some significant reforms that strengthened democratic rule (8):
He established legislative bodies run by individuals chosen by lottery, a true test of real democracy, rather than kinship or heredity.
He reorganized the Boule, created with 400 members under Solon, so that it had 500 members, 50 from each tribe.
He also introduced the bouletic oath, “To advise according to the laws what was best for the people”.
The court system (Dikasteria — law courts) was reorganized and had from 201–5001 jurors selected each day, up to 500 from each tribe.
It was the role of the Boule to propose laws to the assembly of voters, who convened in Athens around forty times a year for this purpose. The bills proposed could be rejected, passed or returned for amendments by the assembly.
It is important to stress that Democracy did not arrive in Athens suddenly. The wheels were set in motion in the 7th century. It just so happens that it all came together when Cleisthenes ruled.
Given the nature of direct democratic rule in Athens, it comes as no surprise that Hippias did not fit in. It was nothing personal. Athenian democracy was incompatible with oligarchy and monarchy. Hippias had no chance to rule Athens again, if this was left to the Athenians to decide.
For this reason during the Ionian Revolt, which I will briefly discuss in the next section, he decided to join the Persians and return to Athens as a victor with the Persian army and navy.
The Ionian Revolt (499-493 BC)
The Ionian Revolt is the precursor of the Greek-Persian Wars on Greek soil and sea.
By the time of Darius I, the Persian empire covered most of southwest Asia and Asia Minor, reaching as far as the easternmost boundaries of Europe. The Persians demanded tribute and respect from all they dominated. (7)
The Ionian revolt started at 499, when the Ionian cities of Minor Asia rebelled against the Persian King Darius.
The Athenians and Eretrians sent a task force of 25 triremes to Asia Minor to aid the revolt. (5)
From 499 to 494 there were a lot of campaigns without any decisive effect.
By 494, the Persian army and navy had regrouped and made straight for the rebellion epicentre at Miletus. (6)
The decisive confrontation took place at sea, off the small island of Lade. The Persians convinced the Samians to defect, leaving the Ionian navy exposed. Although the Ionians and their allies fought bravely, they lost to the Persians. This was the beginning of the end of the Ionian revolt.
During the revolt, the deposed tyrant of Athens Hippias, fled to the Persian Palace and became an “advisor” to the Persian King Darius I.
We will meet Hippias again in the battle of Marathon.
When it all ended, in 493, one thing was certain. Darius wanted revenge. The Athenians and Eretrians had to pay for their role in the Ionian Revolt.
The first Persian invasion of Greece (492 – 490 BC)
The Persians invaded Greece because they wanted to punish Athens and Eretria for their role in the Ionian Revolt. Darius I also wanted to expand his control of the Eastern Mediterranean.
There were two campaigns in the first Persian invasion of Greece.
The first in 492 under Mardonius, saw the Persians take over Thrace and Macedon. In 491, Darius sent ambassadors to all Greek Cities, demanding their submission. Almost all cities submitted, except Athens and Sparta. Darius knew that he had to proceed to the next campaign.
In 490, under the command of his nephew Artaphernes and the Median admiral Datis, this Persian armada allegedly consisted of 600 ships (troop and transport, provided and manned by subject allies) and an unspecified number of Persian infantry and cavalry, described by Herodotus as ‘powerful and well-equipped’.
Starting from the island of Naxos, the Persians captured a number of other Greek cities and islands en route, and besieged Eretria which succumbed after six days, weakened from within by party political strife and a pro-Persian faction which betrayed the city. A few days later, the Persians sailed for Attica, ‘in high spirits and confident’ (Herodotus). Marathon was selected as the best spot to invade, being closest to Eretria and also the most suitable for cavalry manoeuvres. At least, such was the advice of Hippias who was with this Persian force which he hoped would restore him to power. It was here that his father Pisistratus had landed in 546 for his successful bid for the tyranny in Athens. (1)
Liberty and Equality of civic rights are brave spirit stirring things, and they who, while under the yoke of a despot, had been no better men of war than any of their neighbours, as soon as they were free, became the foremost men of all. For each felt that in fighting for a free commonwealth, he fought for himself and whatever he took in hand he was willing to do the work thoroughly. Herodotus
The Athenian Army
The army was managed by the polemarch, together with ten generals, one elected from each of the tribes. Starting with Kleisthenes, there were ten tribes in the Polis of Athens, therefore there were 10 generals, one elected from each tribe. In their attempt to ensure equality, the Athenians by the 5th century allotted most offices, even the highest archonships. Some positions, however, such as treasurers and the water commissioner, required “technical” knowledge and could not be left to the luck of the draw; these remained elective.
The generalships are the clearest example of this practice, of electing rather than allotting, and many of the leading statesmen of Athens held the position. Perikles, for instance, never served as eponymous archon-nominally the highest post in the state-but he was elected general of his tribe year after year, and from that position he guided Athenian affairs for decades.
The army was made of oplites (men bearing arms), who were Athenian citizens. All oplites were volunteers, and were providing for their arms and equipment. It was considered one of the highest honors to be able to fight for the Polis, as became known to the world with Pericles’ Funeral Oration.
At the time of the Marathon Battle, each tribe (phyle) nominated 1,000 oplites.
Contrary to the Athenian Army, the Persian Army consisted mostly of people who were conscripted from various occupied territories, including Ionia. Only the officers were Persians.
From a technical perspective, the Athenian Army had two major disadvantages compared to the Persian. The Athenians had no cavalry and no arch men.
The Battle
In overall charge of the Athenian Army was the War-Archon (polemarch), Callimachus, who had been elected by the whole citizen body. (5)
Initially there was a big disagreement among the generals. Should they go to Marathon and battle the Persians, or should they stay in Athens and protect the city?
The argument was won by Miltiades, who convinced Callimachus that they should battle the Persians in Marathon.
Militiades was one of the ten generals under the polemarch, but after the crucial decision was made, by the consensus of the generals he was placed in command. The win in Marathon is attributed to Miltiades’ genius by many historians.
The forces of the Athenians and the Plataeans totaled only 11,000 men (the column of the Plataeans was 1,000 strong) – the Persian force was perhaps 20-25,000 strong. (11)
While the two armies were facing each other on the Marathon plain, the Spartans were celebrating a period of peace and could not move to the aid of the Athenians before the pweriod was over, somewhere around the middle of August 490.
Therefore, it appears to have been to the benefit of the Athenians to wait.
We do not know who attacked first. But the battle bagan before the Spartans even left their city to march to Athens.
Early in the morning of the batle, the Persians followed Hippias’ advice and sent most of their ships and cavalry to Phaleron, the port of Athens. They thus thought that after the battle in Marathon they could easily capture the city that was not defended, as all armed units were in Marathon. This journey from Marathon to Phaleron would take 6 to 8 hours.
The Athenians were informed by Ionian soldiers in the Persian Army that the fleet had sailed and Miltiades decidd to attack.
The battle started at arounf 05:30 in the morning and it was over in three hours.
At the time of the battle commencing there was only around one mile (1.5 kilometres) separating both armies.
The formation of the Greek army was one with the central armed forces having soldiers in rank of 4 while the flanking forces had soldiers in rank of 8. This formation then either marched or ran (most likely marched) the distance to the Persian forces and stopped some 200 metres short of the Persian army.
At this point the Greek army went into a mad run to the enemy. Upon battle commencing the Greek middle ranks of four were pushed back slightly, but the flanks routed the Persians flanks that then fled back to their ships.
After the battle was over, and decidely won by the Athenians, Miltiades left a small contingent to guard the area so that the Persians would not be able to land again in Marathon, and with the rest of the Army marched back to Athens. They made it on time, so that when the PErsian navy arrived in Phaleron, they found the Athenian Army ready to welcome them.
After an assessment of the situation, the Persians decided to abort the mission to conquer Athens and sailed back to their land.
Hippias is said to have died at Lemnos, on the journey back “home”.
Herodotus on the Battle of Marathon (10)
112. The lines were drawn up, and the sacrifices were favorable; so the Athenians were permitted to charge, and they advanced on the Persians at a run. There was not less than eight stades in the no man’s-land between the two armies. The Persians, seeing them coming at a run, made ready to receive them; but they believed that the Athenians were possessed by some very desperate madness, seeing their small numbers and their running to meet their enemies without support of cavalry or archers. That was what the barbarians thought; but the Athenians, when they came to hand-to-hand fighting, fought right worthily. They were the first Greeks we know of to charge their enemy at a run and the first to face the sight of the Median dress and the men who wore it. For till then the Greeks were terrified even to hear the names of the Medes.
113. The fight at Marathon went on for a long time, and in the center the barbarians won, where the Persians themselves and the Sacae were stationed. At this point they won, and broke the Greeks, and pursued them inland. But on each wing the Athenians and the Plataeans were victorious, and, as they conquered, they let flee the part of the barbarian army they had routed, and, joining their two wings together, they fought the Persians who had broken their center; and then the Athenians won the day. As the Persians fled, the Greeks followed them, hacking at them, until they came to the sea. Then the Greeks called for fire and laid hold of the ships.
114. At this point of the struggle the polemarch [Callimachus] was killed, having proved himself a good man and true, and, of the generals, there died Stesilaus, son of Thrasylaus. And Cynegirus, the son of Euphorion, gripped with his hand the poop of one of the ships and had his hand chopped off with an axe and so died, and many renowned Athenians also.
115. In this fashion the Athenians captured seven of the ships. With the rest of the fleet, the barbarians, backing water, and taking from the island where they had left them the slaves from Eretria, rounded Cape Sunium, because they wished to get to Athens before the Athenians could reach it. There was a slander prevalent in Athens that they got this idea from a contrivance of the Alcmaeonidae, in accord with a covenant they had made with the Persians, showed a signal, the holding-up of a shield, for those barbarians who were on shipboard.
116. They rounded Sunium, all right; but the Athenians, rushing with all speed to defend their city, reached it first, before the barbarians came, and encamped, moving from one sanctuary of Heracles – the one at Marathon – to another, the one at Cynosarges. The barbarians anchored off Phalerum – for in those days that was the harbor of Athens – and, after riding at anchor there for a while, they sailed back, off to Asia.
117. In this battle of Marathon there died, of the barbarians, about six thousand four hundred men, and, of the Athenians, one hundred and ninety-two. Those were the numbers of the fallen on both sides. . . .
Aeschylus and Cavafy
One of Marathon’s more renowned combatants, the ancient Greek playwright Aeschylus, who ultimately was recognized as the ‘Father of Tragedy’ purportedly composed his own epitaph. An indication of the battle’s significance is that he did not mention any of the great works in his distinguished oeuvre, only of his exploits on this highly venerated battlefield.
Beneath this stone lies Aeschylus, son of Euphorion, the Athenian,
who perished in the wheat-bearing land of Gela;
of his noble prowess the grove of Marathon can speak,
or the long-haired Persian who knows it well
Ο Αισχύλος, ο Αθηναίος γιός του Ευφορίωνα βρισκεται σε τουτο το μνημα
Έκλεισε τα μάτια στη Γέλα, την εύφορη σε δημητριακά
Τη δοκιμασμένη του γενναιότητα μαρτυρεί το δάσος του Μαραθώνα
και ο πυκνόμαλλος Μήδος που τη γνώρισε καλά
The inscription on his graveyard signifies according to Castoriadis (4) the primary importance of “belonging to the City”, of the solidarity that existed within the collective body of soldiers – citizens.
Castoriadis (4) also mentions the actor in Cavafy’s “The yound men of Sidon” who protests that the inscription on Aeschylus’ grave is unacceptable:
“…to set down for your memorial
merely that as an ordinary soldier, one of the herd,
you too fought against Datis and Artaphernis.”
(translation Edmund Keeley/Philip Sherrard)
Marathon Memorial Stele – Epigram by Simonides of Ceos
Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι
χρυσοφόρων Μήδων ἐστόρεσαν δύναμιν
Fighting in the forefront of the Hellenes, the Athenians at Marathon
“THE TURKISH cavalry presented a magnificent spectacle as it cantered along the waterfront. The horsemen sat high in their saddles, their scimitars unsheathed and glinting in the sun. On their heads they wore black Circassian fezzes adorned with the crescent and star. As they rode, they cried out, ‘Korkma! Korkma! ‘Fear not! Fear not!’
Their entry into the city of Smyrna on 9 September 1922 was watched by thousands of anxious inhabitants. On the terrace of the famous Sporting Club, a group of British businessmen rose to their feet in order to catch a better view of the historic scene. From the nearby Greek warehouses, the packers and stevedores spilled out onto the quayside. ‘Long Live Kemal,’ they cried nervously, praising the man who would soon acquire the sobriquet Ataturk.” (9th September 1922)
Giles Milton, Paradise Lost, Smyrna 1922: The destruction of Islam’s city of tolerance
I was in Smyrna in May of 1917, when Turkey severed relations with the United States, and I received the oral and written statements of native-born American eye-witnesses of the vast and incredibly horrible Armenian massacres of 1915-16 — some of which will be here given for the first time; I personally observed and otherwise confirmed the outrageous treatment of the Christian population of the Smyrna vilayet, both during the Great War, and before its outbreak. I returned to Smyrna later and was there up until the evening of September 11, 1922, on which date the city was set on fire by the army of Mustapha Khemal, and a large part of its population done to death, and I witnessed the development of that Dantesque tragedy, which possesses few, if any parallels in the history of the world.
George Horton, The Blight of Asia
1918
The Moudros (island of Lemnos) Armistice, concluded on 30 October 1918, put an end to the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in World War One
1919
18 January: Peace Conference opens in Versailles.
3 February: Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos demands the entire East Thrace and the Aegean shores of Anatolia including Izmir to be annexed to Greece.
8 February: French General Franchet d’Esperey, commander of the Allied Army, enters Istanbul mounted on a white horse.
4 March: Damat Ferit Paşa, brother-in-law of the Sultan, appointed as the new Grand Vizier.
8 April: British Foreign Minister, Lord Balfour, proposed Istanbul to become a neutral zone under the administration of the League of Nations.
29 April: Italian warship Caio Duilio anchors at Izmir.
Altay Atlı
1919
30 April: Sultan Vahidettin sends Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia as inspector general.
6 May: Allied nations agree to allow Greek occupation of Izmir.
15 May: Izmir occupied by the Greek army. Journalist Hasan Tahsin shoots a Greek flag bearer, firing the first bullet of the Turkish resistance.
16 May: Mustafa Kemal leaves Istanbul.
19 May: Mustafa Kemal arrives in Samsun. Turkish War of Independence begins.
24 May: Demonstration at Sultanahmet in Istanbul against the occupation of Izmir.
Altay Atlı
“At the ceremony on 10 August 1920 (Treaty of Sevres) the Ottoman signatories agreed on behalf of their countrymen that Thrace be ceded to Greece, and that Greece would be sovereign in the Izmir (Smyrna) area for five years – after which the League of Nations would decide whether it became a full part of Greece; the frontiers of an independent Armenian state were to be determined by the US President Woodrow Wilson; the Kurdish areas of south-eastern Anatolia were to remain under Ottoman sovereignty for the present, with the question of whether the Kurds might become independent left to the decision of the LEague of Nations; and so on. The empire had shrunk to comprise Istanbul and northern Anatolia – large swathes of which were presently under occupation.”
Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream
Question: In June 1920, the Greek Army carried out an offensive move, towards the Büyük Menderes River (Meander) Valley, Karşıyaka (Peramos) and Alaşehir (Philadelphia). What was the point of this offensive? Was it consistent with a strategy? Was there a strategy at all? Or the military operations were carried out in a rather cavalier and opportunistic way? In this case possibly to give support to the British?
“The shadow of Sèvres [i.e. of the humiliating Sèvres treaty of 1920, which left much of Anatolia’s fate in the hands of Greece and the League of Nations] hangs over Turkey to this day in the lingering fear that foreign enemies and their collaborators inside Turkey may again seek to divide the state which was defended with such tenacity and at such cost. Attitudes in some quarters of Turkish society to the possibility of entry to the European Union are also colored by the specter of Sèvres, and European intentions are closely scrutinized for signs of duplicity.”
Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream
I have the honor to call the attention of the (US State) Department to the fact that immediately after the Greeks landed in Smyrna (1919), I telegraphed that this would prove a second “Syracusan Expedition”, referring to the war against Syracuse in 413 B.C. which led to the complete depletion of the Athenian treasury and the effacement of Athens as the leading power of the ancient world.
George Horton, extract from the report written on September 26th and 27th, 1922
The landing of the Greeks in Asia Minor as actually carried out was the great mistake of Venizelos. Though undoubtedly asked by the representatives of all the allies to go to Smyrna, he should not have done so without an actual treaty, with a written statement of what support they would give. To avoid the horrible catastrophe which has followed, which is exciting the fanaticism and daring of the entire Mussulman world, involving both France and Italy in untold dangers, only two plans were possible: (1st) Never to have sent the Greeks to Asia Minor; (2nd) Once having sent them there, to support them in a loyal manner. What really happened was immediate dissension among the allies as always in history among Christians. Italy, which had practically been promised Smyrna, started a port at New Ephesus to draw the trade if possible away from the former city and began to sell arms to the Turks and to flatter them. The French, to undermine Great Britain in the Near East, took up an attitude towards the Turks which finally resulted in the Treaty of Angora and the recognition by the French of that government.
George Horton, extract from the report written on September 26th and 27th, 1922
Question: When Venizelos lost the elections in November 1920 and King Constantine returned to power, the Greek Army carried out offenses towards the East, moving in the direction of Ankara. What was the point of these offensives? Now that Venizelos was gone, we see that the other side is carrying out an even more opportunistic military operation.
I remember the exciting time I had on the morning of September 13 (1922), when I was on my way to the office. I was coming through the Armenian quarter, and as ill luck would have it, fell in with a mob. There was firing on both sides, for of course, Turkish soldiers were everywhere.
I had long since taken the precautionary measure of arming myself with an American flag, for that little bit of bunting was of more potential defense than any Colt automatic. Finding myself in this pleasant little party, I pulled out my flag, pinned it on, and made for the nearest wall.
I finally reached it and then walked sideways for quite a distance, for I had always been told that if you must be shot by all means avoid being shot in the back.
Asa Jennings
Wednesday, the 13th …I see a Turk who approached me say, ‘We did what was due; you turn back.’ The Turk, who obviously had assumed an active role in the arson, takes me obviously for his compatriot and accomplice and advises me not to advance, but to turn back. I answer, “Very well,” with the attitude of someone who understands the situation and I stop for a moment to distance myself from the Turk and to avoid conversation….”
Garabed Hatcherian
“Within hours of Ataturk’s victorious entry into the beautiful, thriving and predominantly Greek city of Smyrna (now Izmir), Turkish soldiers began the killing and raping of Greeks and Armenians, and the looting and pillaging of their homes and shops. Over 100,000 Greek and Armenian civilians were killed by the Turks…”
Marjorie Housepian Dobkin
“The strange thing was . . . how they screamed every night at midnight. I do not know why they screamed at that time. We were in the harbor and they were all on the pier and at midnight they started screaming. . . . The worst . . . were the women with dead babies. You couldn’t get the women to give up their dead babies. They’d have babies dead for six days. Wouldn’t give them up. Nothing you could do about it.”
Ernest Hemingway, “On the Quai at Smyrna,” The Short Stories
Question: Why did the Greek Army evacuate Smyrna on the 8th September? Was it so difficult to figure out that Kemal and his troops would not be kind to the civilian population? In the face of certain disaster, the Greek Army fled leaving the civilian Christians behind. This in the context of the presence of ships of the Allied forces.
More recently a mutual friend arranged for me to interview Nino Russo of Freeport, Long Island; I was happy to obtain an Italian view. A youthful eighty years old when I spoke with him, Russo had been ship’s engineer on the Italian battleship Vittore Imanuele, which had sailed into Smyrna harbor just as the fires were beginning to break out at various points in the city. Russo spoke with the same intense feeling as had most of the American seamen I interviewed. The heat at one point was so strong, he confirmed, that even though his large ship stood at considerable distance from the shore, it had to move back. The Italians had come in to pick up their own nationals but they sent out twenty lifeboats and picked up anyone within range without asking who was or was not Italian. “There were so many bodies in the water you couldn’t count. Everybody, … all the big-shots, the Captain, all those people going back and forth to shore, they knew and they reported that the Turks were burning Smyrna . All the crew, we all knew it was the Turks.” None of his testimony is new, but it is noteworthy considering that Italian policy strongly and openly supported the Turks. Russo’s account also confirms the victims’ reports concerning the kindness of Italian ships and corroborated other reports of the intense heat on the waterfront at the height of the fire.
Marjorie Housepian Dobkin
I have also the honor also to point out to the Department that all massacres on a large scale perpetrated by Turks, and the history of the Turkish empire is largely a history of massacres, are always ordered by higher authorities. Anyone who believes that the forces of Mustapha Kemal got out of hand at Smyrna and that he controlled them as soon as he could, knows nothing about the history of Turkey or events in the Near East. I believe also if the Allied fleets in Smyrna harbor, the French, Italians, British and Americans, had emphatically told Mustapha Kemal that there must be no massacring, none would have taken place. If they told him today that he must cease carrying off the men between eighteen and forty-five into the interior, he would stop, but when he sees the great powers of the world sitting by in security on their battleships watching his fearful procedures, he is emboldened to greated and still greater excesses. The sight of a massacre going on under the eyes of the great powers of Europe and with their seemingly tacit consent, is one that I hope never to see again.
I believe that when the real truth is known of what happened in Smyrna and what has been happening in the Near East, all decent people in Europe and the United States will feel as I do.
George Horton, extract from the report written on September 26th and 27th, 1922
The retreating Greek Army left Smyrna on September 8, 1922; the Turkish Army occupied the city on September 9, and the fire was started on September 13. From that date, the Christian population, Turkish subjects of the Greek Orthodox religion, and Armenians, had been without shelter. During the fire with its attendant murders, robberies and other outrages, men, women and children swam from the quay, and every boat, raft and floating bit of timber was utilized in a desperate effort to reach the ships in the harbor.
The mothers with families were not able to swim and take their little ones on their backs, but the strong, who had the luck to board the ships in the beginning while the fire was raging, were not put ashore. They were taken away and saved from the additional anguish and suffering experienced by those who remained on the quay, after the representatives of the different nations had been officially instructed to maintain neutrality.
There were approximately 300,000 people huddled together on the cobblestones of the Smyrna waterfront and hiding in the ruins, when we reached that port. For ten days and nights, they had held their places. The quay, within view of the warships of the Allied nations in the harbor, and within range of their searchlights at night, was the zone of greatest safety, the least likely place for a wholesale massacre.
City-dwelling human beings, suddenly deprived of the conveniences of civilized life, are utterly unable to care for themselves. They are far more offensive than animals can possibly be. The people squatting on that quay were filthy. They had no means of keeping clean. They dared not go back into the ruins of the city for any purpose, lest they lose their lives. In less than two weeks the quay had become a reeking sewer in which the refugees sat and waited for deliverance. When that crowd stirred, the stench was beyond belief.
Esther Lovejoy, Certain Samaritans
The last view of the ill-fated town by daylight was one of vast enveloping clouds rolling up to heaven, a narrow water-front covered with a great throng of people—an ever-increasing throng, with the fire behind and the sea before, and a powerful fleet of inter-allied battle-ships, among which were two American destroyers, moored a short distance from the quay and looking on.
As the destroyer moved away from the fearful scene and darkness descended, the flames, raging now over a vast area, grew brighter and brighter, presenting a scene of awful and sinister beauty. Historians and archeologists have declared that they know of but one event in the annals of the world which can equal in savagery, extent and all the elements of horror, cruelty and human suffering, the destruction of Smyrna and its Christian population by the Turks, and this was the demolition of Carthage by the Romans.
Certainly at Smyrna, nothing was lacking in the way of atrocity, lust, cruelty and all that fury of human passion which, given their full play, degrade the human race to a level lower than the vilest and cruelest of beasts. For during all this diabolical drama the Turks robbed and raped. Even the raping can be understood as an impulse of nature, irresistible perhaps, when passions are running wild among a people of low mentality and less civilization, but the repeated robbing of women and girls can be attributed neither to religious frenzy nor to animal passions. One of the keenest impressions, which I brought away with me from Smyrna was a feeling of shame that I belonged to the human race.
At the destruction of Smyrna there was one feature for which Carthage presents no parallel. There was no fleet of Christian battle-ships at Carthage looking on at a situation for which their governments were responsible. There were no American cruisers at Carthage.
The Turks were glutting freely their racial and religious lust for slaughter, rape and plunder within a stone’s throw of the Allied and American battle-ships because they had been systematically led to believe that they would not be interfered with. A united order from the commanders or from any two of them—one harmless shell thrown across the Turkish quarter—would have brought the Turks to their senses.
And this, the presence of those battle-ships in Smyrna harbor, in the year of our Lord 1922, impotently watching the last great scene in the tragedy of the Christians of Turkey, was the saddest and most significant feature of the whole picture.
George Horton, The Blight of Asia
1922
11 October: Armistice of Mudanya signed between Turkey, Italy, France and Britain. Greece accedes to the armistice three days later. East Thrace as far as the Maritsa River and Edirne are handed over by Greece to Turkey. Turkish sovereignty over Istanbul and the Dardanelles is recognized.
20 October: Peace Conference opens in Lausanne.
1 November: The Sultanate is abolished.
17 November: Sultan Vahidettin leaves Istanbul on board the British warship Malaya.
Altay Atlı
“In Smyrna on September 24, 1922, the Hatcherian family managed to escape to the Greek island of Mitilini, leaving behind in Akhisar ten members of the extended family on both sides. All ten family members including the mothers and brothers with their families, were massacred after the occupation of Akhisar [original Greek name was Thyatira 80km/50miles NE of Smyrna] by the Kemalist army. Another positive outcome of reading the diary was that I was once again filled with gratitude toward Greece, the country of my birth, for its humanitarian act of giving shelter, along with thousands of Greeks, to so many Armenian refugees. Among them was my grandfather with his family who was given the opportunity to restore not only a normal and happy family life, but also his faith in humanity. Reading the pages of my grandfather’s ordeal, I also realized how fortunate we are to be living in a free humanitarian country like Canada, a country which espouses the humanitarian principles in which my grandfather believed.”
Dora Sakayan
Another thing that has greatly handicapped the Greeks is their pernicious and corrupt politics. The amount to which politics is played in Greece and the extent to which the Greek politician will go, even to the sacrifice of his country and of many lives in order to keep his party in power for a few weeks can hardly be believed. The overthrow of Venizelos, Greece’s great advocate in Europe and America, and the bringing back of its discredited king, was the beginning of the end. Politics is played to such an extent that even now, in the face of this tremendous tragedy to Greece, it is not lost sight of, and the Royalist party will not even allow Venizelists to distribute money which they are receiving from Europe or to establish soup kitchens.
George Horton, extract from the report written on September 26th and 27th, 1922
The people on the quay were panic-stricken. The Allies had forsaken them. The Turks were going to deport them to the interior on the thirtieth of September. What country would help them? Greece had signified her willingness to receive them, but how could they get there without ships? For twelve terrible days and nights they had watched, waited and prayed. The stones of the quay were hard, but not so hard as the hearts of nations! The sun was blistering during the daylight hours, and the nights were full of horror, but the time was passing so fast, so fast. Only five days more to the thirtieth of September and deportation.(3). Even if ships should come, how could they all embark in so short a time? Besides, Greece was poor and overcrowded, and since the strong countries, indirectly responsible for their suffering, had definitely refused to admit them, perhaps Greece would change her mind. Why should one nation accept all the Anatolian Christians fleeing for their lives, including the Armenians?
Most of them called themselves Greek, but were they Greek? They had never lived in Greece and many of them could not speak the Greek language. On the other hand, they were not Turks, it seemed, although they had lived under the Turkish Government, generation after generation, for five hundred years. They were people without a country, and the Armenians among them were sorry they had not turned toward Russia and joined the Soviet.
Nationality and religion to the people on that quay was a hopeless muddle. Two hundred years before the colonization of America the Turks had taken Smyrna, but Turk meant religion to most of the Christian people in Asia Minor. They had seen too many Christians turn Turk by accepting the Mohammedan faith. Before accepting the Faith they were Armenians or Greeks perhaps, and the next day they were Turks, with all the privileges of Turks.
This confusion of nationality and religion was very well shown in the strange case of a certain man who had been in the service of an American tobacco company for so many years that he looked, acted, talked and no doubt felt like an American. He told me quite simply that he was a man without a country, and that that was the status of most of the Christian people in Turkey. His father was German, his mother English, and he was born in Smyrna. Naturally, they were cosmopolitan in thought and language, but he had always considered himself of German nationality. He had married a German girl and he thought his children were Germans. They were all members of the Lutheran Church.
Esther Lovejoy, Certain Samaritans
I firmly believe from my observations in Smyrna and from information which I have received from various sources, that the terrible disaster which has happened to the inhabitants of Asia Minor was the result of a contemptible political move. The party in power believed they could not get the help of Europe without turning out Constantine and bringing back Venizelos. Without that help, they could not stay in Smyrna, they could not announce that they were willing to withdraw their armies from the Smyrna district, and they therefore deliberately provoked the debacle which the world has seen. For months there has been a steady withdrawing of Venizelist officers and their replacing by trusted Royal-ists, many of whom have been deserting their troops, leaving whole regiments without officers. I am credibly informed that the Greek army, even at the last moment, could have made a stand and retrieved the situation as the Turkish forces which entered Smyrna were insignificant. But even the Greek officers who desired to make a stand and expressed their ability to do so were ordered to retire.
George Horton, extract from the report written on September 26th and 27th, 1922
1923
4 February: Talks in Lausanne interrupted due to Turkish protest.
23 April: Talks in Lausanne resume.
24 July: Treaty of Lausanne signed between Turkey, Greece and other countries that fought the First World War and the Turkish Independence War. Turkey recovers full sovereign rights over its territory.
6 October: Occupation forces leave Istanbul.
13 October: Ankara declared as the capital of the new Turkish State.
29 October: The Republic of Turkey is proclaimed.
Altay Atlı
In one of its most controversial clauses, the Lausanne treaty barred the return of the refugees who had left Anatolia during the war and stipulated the exchange of the remaining Greek Orthodox residents of Turkey for the Muslims of Macedonia and western Thrace.
A few months following the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, by which the Allied powers and the world recognized the independence and sovereignty of Turkey, the Republican People’s Party was established on 9 September 1923 and Mustafa Kemal was elected as its chairman.
“The total number of Christians who fled to Greece was probably in the region of 1.2 million with the main wave occurring in 1922 before the signing of the convention. According to the official records of the Mixed Commission set up to monitor the movements, the “Greeks’ who were transferred after 1923 numbered 189,916 and the number of Muslims expelled to Turkey was 355,635 [Ladas 1932, 438-439; but using the same source Eddy 1931, 201 states that the post-1923 exchange involved 192,356 Greeks from Turkey and 354,647 Muslims from Greece.”
Matthew J. Gibney, Randall Hansen. (2005). Immigration and Asylum: from 1900 to the Present, Volume 3. ABC-CLIO. p. 377.
In the aftermath of the First World War, Greece again paved the way for Europe’s future. Only now it was democracy’s dark side that came to the fore. In a world of nation-states, ethnic minorities like Greece’s Muslim population and the Orthodox Christians of Asia Minor were a recipe for international instability. In the early 1920s, Greek and Turkish leaders decided to swap their minority populations, expelling some two million Christians and Muslims in the interest of national homogeneity. The Greco-Turkish population exchange was the largest such organized refugee movement in history to that point and a model that the Nazis and others would point to later for displacing peoples in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and India.
Mark Mazower: Democracy’s Cradle, Rocking the World
For several years after the Smyrna debacle, American interests in Turkey conducted an intensive campaign to revise public opinion at home. This was no small task, for in the course of massive fund appeals the American Protestant leadership had created a certain amount of antipathy toward Turkey and sympathy for her minorities. Yet the Lausanne Treaty constituted a victory for Turkey on the question of the Christian population and a triumph of political and economic considerations for the West. Not the least of these was the matter of oil. According to Standard Oil Company historians, “there were many issues of importance at Lausanne but oil usurped the center of the stage”.
In varying degrees every Western nation involved had to defend this order of priorities. But the greater the discrepancy between a nation’s professed and actual motives, the greater its need to justify its policies. Political scientists might wave “morality” aside as irrelevant to the national interest. American historians might proclaim the triumph of American diplomacy; but spokesmen for America had been denouncing the ignominious motives of her rivals too loudly and for too long to let the nature of her triumph speak for itself. In 1924 the Near East desk at the State Department was still busily enlisting co-operative writers to its cause.